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Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COSO sponsored this study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, to provide a
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between January 1998 and
December 2007. This study updates our understanding of fraud since COSO’s 1999
issuance of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997. Some of the more critical
findings of the present study are:


There were 347 alleged cases of public company fraudulent financial reporting from
1998 to 2007, versus 294 cases from 1987 to 1997. Consistent with the high-profile
frauds at Enron, WorldCom, etc., the dollar magnitude of fraudulent financial
reporting soared in the last decade, with total cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation of nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available
information (mean of nearly $400 million per case). This compares to a mean of $25
million per sample fraud in COSO’s 1999 study. While the largest frauds of the early
2000s skewed the 1998-2007 total and mean cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation upward, the median fraud of $12.05 million in the present study
also was nearly three times larger than the median fraud of $4.1 million in the 1999
COSO study.



The companies allegedly engaging in financial statement fraud had median assets
and revenues just under $100 million. These companies were much larger than
fraud companies in the 1999 COSO study, which had median assets and revenues
under $16 million.



The SEC named the CEO and/or CFO for some level of involvement in 89 percent of
the fraud cases, up from 83 percent of cases in 1987-1997. Within two years of the
completion of the SEC’s investigation, about 20 percent of CEOs/CFOs had been
indicted and over 10 percent had been convicted.



The most common fraud technique involved improper revenue recognition,
followed by the overstatement of existing assets or capitalization of expenses.
Revenue frauds accounted for over 60 percent of the cases, versus 50 percent in
1987-1997.



Relatively few differences in board of director characteristics existed between firms
engaging in fraud and similar firms not engaging in fraud. Also, in some instances,
noted differences were in directions opposite of what might be expected. These
results suggest the importance of research on governance processes and the
interaction of various governance mechanisms.



Twenty-six percent of the fraud firms changed auditors between the last clean
financial statements and the last fraudulent financial statements, whereas only 12
percent of no-fraud firms switched auditors during that same time. Sixty percent of
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the fraud firms that changed auditors did so during the fraud period, while the
remaining 40 percent changed in the fiscal period just before the fraud began.


Initial news in the press of an alleged fraud resulted in an average 16.7 percent
abnormal stock price decline in the two days surrounding the news announcement.
In addition, news of an SEC or Department of Justice investigation resulted in an
average 7.3 percent abnormal stock price decline.



Long-term negative consequences of fraud were apparent. Companies engaged in
fraud often experienced bankruptcy, delisting from a stock exchange, or material
asset sales following discovery of fraud – at rates much higher than those
experienced by no-fraud firms.

Given the small number of frauds examined in this study that involve time periods
subsequent to the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, further research will be
needed once sufficient time has passed to allow for more observations of SEC fraud
investigations involving post-SOX time periods before any conclusions can be reached
about the effectiveness of that legislation in reducing instances of fraudulent financial
reporting.
Our hope is that insights contained herein will encourage additional research to better
understand organizational behaviors, leadership dynamics, and other important
aspects of the financial reporting process that may have an impact on fraud prevention,
deterrence, and detection.
We believe the results of this study will be useful to investors, regulators, stock
exchanges, boards of directors, external auditors, and other key stakeholders as they
seek to prevent, deter, and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
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I. Introduction, Key Findings, and Insights
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant consequences for the organization
and its stakeholders, as well as for public confidence in capital markets. Periodic high
profile cases of fraudulent financial reporting raise concerns about the credibility of the
U.S. financial reporting process and call into question the roles of management,
auditors, regulators, and analysts, among others.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) sponsored this research project to provide an extensive updated analysis of
financial statement fraud occurrences affecting U.S. public companies. In the mid-1980s,
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, sponsored by COSO,
identified numerous causal factors believed to contribute to financial statement fraud
(NCFFR 1987).1 In addition, the COSO-sponsored study released in 1999, Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, provided a
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting through the late 1990s
(Beasley et al. 1999).
Less is known about the profile of fraudulent financial reporting since 1997.2
While the U.S. experienced an unprecedented spate of large company accounting frauds
in 2001 and 2002, including those at Enron and WorldCom, it is unclear to what extent
the typical fraud profile has changed in the past decade. Thus, COSO commissioned this
research project to provide COSO, and others, with recent information that can be used
to guide future efforts to combat the problem of financial statement fraud and to
provide a better understanding of financial statement fraud cases.
This research has three specific objectives:


To identify instances of alleged fraudulent financial reporting by registrants of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosed by the SEC in an
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) issued during the period
1998-2007.

We use the terms “fraudulent financial reporting” and “financial statement fraud” interchangeably
throughout this document to represent the intentional material misstatement of financial statements or
financial disclosures (in notes to the financial statements or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filings) or the perpetration of an illegal act that has a material direct effect on the financial statements or
financial disclosures.
2 Others have studied aspects of fraudulent financial reporting since COSO’s 1999 study was released. For
example, see Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SEC 2003), Ten Things About
Financial Statement Fraud – Second Edition (Deloitte 2008a), Ten Things About the Consequences of
Financial Statement Fraud (Deloitte 2008b), and Ten Things About Financial Statement Fraud – Third
Edition (Deloitte 2009).
1
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To examine certain key company and management characteristics for the
companies involved in instances of financial statement fraud identified in AAERs
and to compare certain fraud company characteristics to those of no-fraud control
firms.
To provide insights related to preventing, deterring, and detecting fraudulent
financial reporting.

This study builds on the previous COSO-sponsored study, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987-1997. Where possible, we use or adapt language from the prior report,
and we compare key findings from this study to our findings in the 1999 study to
highlight notable differences.
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial reporting alleged by the SEC in
AAERs issued during the ten-year period between January 1998 and December 2007.
The AAERs, which contain summaries of enforcement actions by the SEC against public
companies, represent one of the most comprehensive sources of alleged cases of
financial statement fraud in the U.S. We focused on AAERs that involved an alleged
violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the
1933 Securities Act given that these represent the primary antifraud provisions related
to financial reporting for U.S. public companies. Our focus was on cases clearly
involving financial statement fraud. We excluded from our analysis restatements of
financial statements due to errors or earnings management activities that did not result
in a violation of the federal antifraud statutes.
Our search identified 347 companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent
financial reporting during the ten-year period. These 347 alleged fraud instances are
described in 1,335 individual AAERs (1,013 AAERs directly relate to fraud, while the
other 322 describe non-fraud allegations related to the fraud companies). Findings
reported in this study are based on information we obtained from our detailed analysis
of (a) AAERs related to each of the sample fraud companies, (b) databases containing
selected financial statement data reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the
period the alleged financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued
during the alleged fraud period, and (d) databases containing business press articles
about the sample companies after the fraud was disclosed, as well as about the no-fraud
control firms.
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KEY FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS
Several key findings and insights emerge from the detailed analysis of the 347 financial
statement fraud cases. COSO hopes that close evaluation of these findings and insights
will spawn ideas and further research that will help to strengthen the prevention,
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
Occurrences of Financial Statement Fraud
The vast majority of public companies appear to provide financial reports that are free
from material misstatements due to fraud. However, financial statement fraud
continued to exist during the 1998-2007 time frame, including the well-publicized
frauds at Enron and WorldCom, among others. During the ten-year period 1998-2007,
the SEC alleged fraud involving 347 companies as described in 1,335 AAERs. In
comparison, the 1999 COSO study spanned 11 years of SEC fraud investigations in
which nearly 300 frauds were described in over 800 AAERs. Despite thousands of
publicly-traded companies filing apparently fairly stated financial statements over the
ten-year period, the existence of fraud in any one of the 347 cases is significant to
stakeholders of the affected entity. In addition, while the incidence of SEC fraud cases
increased somewhat from 1987-1997 to 1998-2007, the magnitude of individual fraud
cases increased markedly, as discussed below. Continued focus on finding ways to
strengthen financial statement fraud prevention, deterrence, and detection is
warranted.
Companies Involved
Fraud affects companies of all sizes. The companies committing fraud had median
revenues and total assets just under $100 million in the period prior to the fraud. While
the size of companies in this study was much larger than in COSO’s 1999 study, which
had median total assets of approximately $15 million, the range of assets or revenues
for companies experiencing fraud was large. Fraud companies included startups with
no assets or revenues, as well as companies with just under $400 billion in assets or
over $100 billion in revenues. Thus, fraud is not limited to companies of a certain size.
Similarly, fraud occurred in a variety of industries. Consistent with COSO’s 1999
study, the most frequent industries where fraud occurred included computer hardware
and software (20 percent of the fraud companies) and other manufacturing (20
percent). These findings suggest that any actions to prevent, deter, or detect fraud
should not be limited to any particular industry.
Most fraud companies’ common stock (73 percent3 of the sample) traded in
over-the-counter markets and was not listed on the New York or American Stock
Exchanges, similar to the frauds examined in COSO’s 1999 study. Further study about
Fifty percent of the firms were listed on NASDAQ, and 23 percent of the firms were traded on electronic
bulletin boards, pink sheets, or via other over-the-counter markets.
3
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differences in exchange listing requirements may provide insights as to whether certain
requirements for registrants of the larger exchanges are relevant to the over-thecounter markets.
Financial Health of Companies Involved
Some companies committing fraud were experiencing net losses or were in close to
break-even positions in periods before the fraud. The lowest quartile reflected
companies in a net loss position and suffering from net operating cash flow shortages.
Median company net income was $875,000, while median cash flow from operations
was $317,000. Such closeness to breakeven positions is consistent with results in
COSO’s 1999 study. Thus, pressures of financial strain or distress may have provided
incentives for fraudulent activities for some fraud companies. Enhanced skepticism
when companies are experiencing financial stress may be warranted for key
governance participants, including the board of directors, auditors, and regulators.
Management’s Tone at the Top
We gathered information about the types of individuals named by the SEC in the AAERs.
The SEC continues to name senior management in AAERs for some level of involvement
in the fraud, with the CEO and/or CFO named in almost all cases. These findings have
important implications for the control environment.
Executives Named
In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO, and in 65 percent the AAERs
named the CFO as being associated with the fraud. When considered together, in 89
percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO and/or CFO as being associated with the
financial statement fraud. In COSO’s 1999 study, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 83
percent of the cases. In addition, although the incidence of enforcement actions against
the CEO was the same in the current study as in the 1999 study (72 percent of cases in
each period), enforcement actions against the CFO were approximately 50 percent
more likely in the current study (65 percent of cases, versus 43 percent in COSO’s 1999
study).
More study is needed to determine if there are leading practices that help to
reduce the risk of senior management involvement in financial statement fraud. For
example, emerging practices may exist related to the screening and selection of senior
executive officers, how they are compensated to avoid excessive fraud risks, and how
boards and others oversee senior management. Mechanisms for sharing of those
practices with wider audiences may need to be considered. In addition, CPA firms may
want to focus additional effort on assessing the integrity of top management and
sharing with the profession those approaches that prove effective.
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Alleged Motivations
The SEC’s most commonly cited motivations for fraud included the need to meet
internal or external earnings expectations, an attempt to conceal the company’s
deteriorating financial condition, the need to increase the stock price, the need to
bolster financial performance for pending equity or debt financing, or the desire to
increase management compensation based on financial results.
Better understanding of the psyche of individuals who have engaged in fraud
may provide insights as to factors that cause an individual to set aside his or her set of
beliefs to engage in fraud. More can be learned about behavioral aspects that lead to
attitudes and rationalizations that ultimately result in an individual or group of
individuals deciding to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (see Ramamoorti
2008). Insights are needed as to factors that might lead an individual known to be of
high integrity and to possess strong ethical values to subsequently justify committing a
fraudulent act. Perhaps insights from prior research studies about leadership and other
organizational behaviors in settings not involving fraud may have insights about
possible motivators of fraudulent financial reporting. The academic community may be
able to provide analyses or syntheses of findings and insights from prior organizational
behavior research that would be helpful in identifying organizational behavior
characteristics that may be associated with drivers of fraudulent financial reporting.
More guidance about how management’s philosophy, integrity, and ethical
culture interact with judgment and decision making is warranted. Insights about these
interactions may serve to strengthen assessments of fraud risk conditions, especially
those related to the attitudes and rationalizations of senior management in high fraud
risk environments.
Nature of the Frauds
We gathered extensive information from the AAERs about the nature of the frauds,
including the amounts involved, the fraud periods, and techniques used.
Size and Time Period of the Frauds
For the period 1998-2007, the total cumulative misstatement or misappropriation was
nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available information (mean of nearly
$400 million per case). This compares to a mean of $25 million of misstatement or
misappropriation per sample fraud in COSO’s 1999 study. While the largest frauds of
the early 2000s skewed the 1998-2007 total and mean cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation upward, the median fraud of $12.05 million in the present study also
was nearly three times larger than the median fraud of $4.1 million in the 1999 COSO
study. Thus, the magnitude of the fraud problem has increased in the past decade.
Most frauds were not isolated to a single fiscal period. The average fraud period
extended 31.4 months, with the median fraud period extending 24 months. This was
www.coso.org

Page 9

Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies
slightly longer than the average and median fraud periods of 23.7 and 21 months,
respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 study. This finding suggests that once fraud is
initiated in one financial period (quarterly or annual), management often continues to
perpetrate fraud in each quarterly and annual financial statement filing for about two
years.
Because there is a significant time lag between the occurrence of fraudulent
financial reporting and the issuance of an AAER related to that fraud instance, most of
the underlying instances of fraudulent financial reporting described in the AAERs
examined in this study occurred before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX). Only 61 of the 347 fraud companies examined in this study issued fraudulent
financial statements involving periods subsequent to 2002, and only a small number of
firms were subject to the provisions of Section 404 of SOX. Thus, future research is
warranted to understand the impact of SOX on fraudulent financial reporting. It is
premature to draw conclusions about the fraud detection impact of that legislation
based on the frauds examined in this study. Furthermore, the approach used in this
study does not allow us to provide any insights about the effect of SOX in preventing or
deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
Fraud Techniques
The two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate the financial
statements involved improper revenue recognition and asset overstatements. The
majority of frauds (61 percent) involved revenue recognition, while 51 percent
involved overstated assets primarily by overvaluing existing assets or capitalizing
expenses. The understatement of expenses and liabilities was much less frequent (18
percent). Misappropriation of assets occurred in 14 percent of the fraud cases, which
was similar to the 12 percent reported in COSO’s 1999 study.
The occurrence of improper revenue recognition (61 percent) was higher than
the rate of occurrence (50 percent) reported in COSO’s 1999 study. Close examination
of revenue accounting and related fraud techniques is needed to better understand how
revenue recognition is used to distort financial statement information. More detailed
analysis of revenue fraud risk may be needed within industries to strengthen
understanding of how revenue is fraudulently misstated. To the extent that improper
revenue recognition involves non-financial executives, better education and training on
revenue recognition concepts and SEC reporting obligations are needed.
Valuation issues related to recording existing assets deserve more focus, given
that a majority of frauds involved asset overstatements. This concern may be
heightened as financial reporting valuations become more dependent on fair value
accounting.
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Role of the Board of Directors
One of the major contributions of this study is the comparative analysis of board
governance characteristics between fraud firms and a similar set of no-fraud firms. This
allows us to observe whether certain board characteristics are more likely to be
associated with fraud firms relative to no-fraud firms.
Full Board of Directors
The overarching insight from the analysis of differences in board characteristics
between fraud and no-fraud firms is the lack of notable differences in many of the
governance characteristics that have been the focus of regulators, exchanges, and
governance experts in the last several years. For example, firms engaging in fraudulent
financial reporting had more inside directors (i.e., management) than no-fraud firms
during the sub-period 1991-1999.4 However, following changes in stock exchange
listing requirements implemented by the major U.S. exchanges, statistically significant
differences in the composition of boards no longer existed between fraud and no-fraud
firms in 2001-2004. Furthermore, while there are some differences in certain board
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms that are statistically significant, in
many instances the practical significance of those differences is not overwhelming.
Additional research and information-gathering about board processes may be
needed to determine if there are certain board actions or tasks that impact fraud risk
oversight, including board group dynamics, process flow, and board judgment and
decision-making. Perhaps processes related to board agenda setting, the manner in
which information is shared and discussed among the board members, and interactions
between the board and management differ between fraud and no-fraud firms. More
study is warranted.
Audit Committee
With all the focus on audit committees in the last decade, one of the important insights
from this study is that meaningful differences in audit committee characteristics
between fraud and no-fraud firms are generally no longer observed. For example,
almost all fraud and no-fraud firms had audit committees; the average audit committee
size for both groups was about three members; and on average, audit committees of
both groups met nearly four times per year.

Our sample period overlapped the widely recognized Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC)
1999). That report resulted in several changes in stock exchange listing requirements related to board
governance made in 2000 by both the NYSE and NASDAQ. As a result, we partitioned our analysis of the
data into two sub-periods, 1991-1999 and 2001-2004, based on the first fraud year. As explained later in
this document, we excluded from this sub-analysis frauds occurring in the year 2000 because the stock
exchanges made changes to their listing requirements in 2000.
4
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While many audit committee characteristics have been the focus of audit
committee reform and regulation over the past decade, there is little evidence that
these characteristics are associated with the occurrence of fraudulent financial
reporting. Although we no longer see meaningful differences in most audit committee
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms, this does not mean that all audit
committees are similarly effective with respect to preventing, deterring, and detecting
fraudulent financial reporting. Future research may be needed that focuses on the
interaction of other governance mechanisms (e.g., the nominating committee) with the
audit committee’s ability to prevent, deter, and detect fraudulent financial reporting
(see Carcello et al. 2010). And, future research about audit committee processes may be
needed to determine if other characteristics and behaviors of audit committees have an
impact on the prevention, deterrence, or detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
Compensation Committee
Greater focus on the roles and processes used by compensation committees may
provide helpful insights as to how boards consider the impact of compensation policies
on the risk of fraud. Most fraud and no-fraud firms maintained a compensation
committee, and there were few differences in compensation committee characteristics
between fraud firms and no-fraud firms. Because compensation arrangements for
senior executives are often tied to financial statement measures, more study about the
effect of compensation policies and processes on fraud risk and board oversight of that
risk may be needed.
Related Party Transactions
Fraud firms disclosed significantly more related party transactions than no-fraud firms.
Seventy-nine percent of fraud firms had disclosed a related party transaction in the
proxy statement filed during the first fraud period compared to 71 percent of no-fraud
firms for the comparable time period. The higher frequency of related party
transactions for fraud firms suggests that the presence of related party transactions
may reflect heightened fraud risk. Greater scrutiny of related party transactions may be
warranted to determine if the nature of those transactions has broader implications
regarding management’s integrity, philosophy, and ethical culture.
Auditor Considerations
Fraud goes undetected by auditors of all types and sizes. Big Six/Four firms audited 79
percent of the fraud companies during the fraud period (similar for the no-fraud firms
at 83 percent). The challenges of detecting fraudulent misstatements of financial
information affect auditors of entities spanning numerous industries and different sizes.
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Type of Auditor Opinion on the Financial Statements
Virtually all of the fraud firms received an unqualified opinion on the last set of
fraudulently misstated financial statements. However, the unqualified audit report of
fraud firms was more likely (56 percent) to contain additional explanatory language
than for no-fraud firms (36 percent). More research is needed to examine the nature of
the audit report modification and to determine if there is any relation between the
report modification and the nature of the fraud technique employed.
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Because of the significant time lag between the occurrence of fraud and the subsequent
issuance by the SEC of an AAER, only a small number of the 347 instances of fraud
affected accelerated filers subject to Section 404 of SOX. For those firms, the nature of
the Section 404 internal control opinions did not foreshadow future financial reporting
problems. The Section 404 opinions indicated effective internal controls unless there
had already been a restatement or other correction of a 10-K announced. Therefore,
adverse Section 404 opinions for the small sample examined were not diagnostic of
future reporting problems, but instead only highlighted already-announced reporting
problems.
The small sample size available for analysis limits our ability to draw any
significant insights about auditors’ ability to detect internal control weaknesses that
may lead to fraud in the future. It also is important to note that we are unable to
measure the impact of Section 404 in preventing or deterring management from
engaging in fraudulent financial reporting.
Auditor Change and Auditor Implications
The rate of auditor changes for fraud firms was double the rate of auditor changes for
the similar set of no-fraud firms. Twenty-six percent of the fraud firms versus 12
percent of the no-fraud firms changed auditors between the period that the company
issued the last clean financial statements and the period the company issued the last set
of fraudulent financial statements. Sixty percent of the auditor changes for fraud firms
occurred during the fraud period, while the remaining 40 percent of fraud firms that
changed auditors did so during the fiscal period just before the fraud began. A detailed
hindsight analysis of auditor changes involving known instances of fraud may provide
helpful insights about potential relations between conditions leading to auditor changes
and conditions related to fraud occurrences.
Financial statement fraud sometimes implicated the external auditor. Auditors
were named in the AAERs for 78 of the 342 fraud cases (23 percent) where AAERs
named individuals. This was somewhat lower than what was reported (29 percent) in
COSO’s 1999 study. When auditors were named in the AAERs, about 39 percent of those
named were charged with violating the anti-fraud statutes, while the remaining 61
percent were charged with violating non-fraud provisions including Rule 102(e) of the
www.coso.org
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1934 Securities Exchange Act. National audit firms were less likely to be named in an
SEC enforcement action than were non-national firms, even though national firms
audited most of the fraud companies.
Consequences for Individuals and Firms Engaged in Fraud
We gathered extensive data about consequences affecting both individuals serving in
management roles and the companies as a whole for a period of two years subsequent
to the issuance of the last AAER about the fraud. The pairing of fraud firms with nofraud firms allowed us to analyze whether subsequent events affecting individuals and
the company as a whole were significantly different for fraud firms relative to no-fraud
firms.
Consequences for Individuals
The consequences associated with financial statement fraud were severe for individuals
allegedly involved. In almost half of the cases (47 percent), the SEC barred one or more
individuals from serving as an officer or director of a public company. Civil fines were
imposed in 65 percent of the fraud cases, and disgorgements were imposed in 43
percent of the cases. The average fine imposed by the SEC was $12.4 million, and the
average disgorgement was $18.1 million. The cumulative amount of fines for all 347
fraud companies was $2.74 billion, while the cumulative amount of disgorgements was
$2.65 billion. The median fine was $100,000, and the median disgorgement was
$195,000.
Most CEOs and CFOs (80 percent or more) left the company within two years of
the SEC’s last AAER related to the fraud. Twenty-one percent of CEOs were indicted
within that time period, and 64 percent of the indicted CEOs were convicted. Similarly,
17 percent of CFOs were indicted, with 75 percent of the indicted CFOs being convicted.
Despite the magnitude of these individual consequences, the severity of the
penalties may not be a sufficient deterrent. More understanding about the mindset of
fraud perpetrators may be needed to understand the factors individuals take into
account when they engage in fraudulent activity. Better understanding of their
perceptions about possible long-term consequences for engaging in fraud may provide
useful perspectives about the deterrence effect of personal consequences.
Consequences for Companies Committing Fraud
Severe consequences also awaited companies committing fraud. Companies
experienced significant abnormal stock price declines as news of the alleged frauds first
emerged. The average fraud company’s stock price dropped by an abnormal 16.7
percent in the two days surrounding the initial press disclosures of an alleged fraud.
Fraud company stock prices also abnormally declined an average of 7.3 percent in the
two days surrounding the announcement of a fraud investigation by the SEC or
Department of Justice.
www.coso.org
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In addition to the negative stock market reactions to news announcements about
alleged fraud or fraud investigations, many fraud firms suffered long-term
consequences, including bankruptcy, delisting by national exchanges, and material
asset sales. Twenty-eight percent of fraud firms were bankrupt or liquidated within two
years from the year in which the SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud, and 47
percent were delisted from a national stock exchange. Material asset sales also affected
about 62 percent of fraud companies. These rates of occurrence were significantly
higher than the experiences of no-fraud firms during those same time periods.
Conclusion
Detailed analyses of the findings described above are provided in the remainder of this
report. We encourage parties involved in financial reporting to carefully consider the
detailed information presented in this report. We also encourage further research to
better understand many of the underlying factors likely to affect the prevention,
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. COSO hopes numerous
parties will recommit their efforts to improve the prevention, deterrence, and detection
of fraudulent financial reporting.
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OVERVIEW OF REPORT
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of
the approach we took to identify the cases of fraudulent financial reporting and
contains a summary of the sources and methods used to gather data related to each
case. Section III presents the results from our detailed analysis of the 347 cases of
fraudulent financial reporting. Section IV provides concluding comments, and Section V
contains a brief description of the authors who conducted this study.
We are confident that this report, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007,
will prove helpful to parties concerned with corporate financial reporting and will add
to the insights provided by COSO’s 1999 study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 19871997. We hope the study will stimulate greater awareness of new opportunities for
improvements in the corporate financial reporting process, as well as avenues for
future research.

www.coso.org
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II. Description of Research Approach
This study builds on the previous COSO-sponsored study, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987-1997, by presenting findings related to fraudulent financial reporting
for the period 1998-2007. The data collection effort was conducted under the direction
of four accounting researchers (“the authors”) who oversaw the entire study including
generation of this monograph. The authors worked with two research managers, who
monitored and reviewed the work of a data collection team (“the team”). The research
managers reported to and consulted with the authors throughout the entire research
process.
The first step in this research project involved the identification of all alleged
instances of fraudulent financial reporting captured by the SEC in an AAER issued
during the period 1998-2007. In order to obtain detailed publicly-available information
about company-wide and management characteristics of companies involved, the focus
of this study was on instances of fraudulent financial reporting allegedly committed by
SEC registrants that ultimately led to the issuance of an AAER.5
To identify instances of fraudulent financial reporting investigated by the SEC in
the period 1998-2007, the team read all AAERs issued by the SEC between January
1998 and December 2007. From the reading, the team identified all AAERs that
involved an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. We focused on violations of these securities
laws given that these sections of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange
Act are the primary antifraud provisions related to financial statement reporting.
Because violations of these securities provisions generally require the intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, they more specifically indicate alleged instances of financial
statement fraud than do other provisions of the securities laws.6
The AAERs represent one of the most comprehensive sources of alleged,
discovered cases of financial statement fraud in the U.S. However, such an approach
does limit the ability to generalize the results of this study to other settings. Because the
identification of fraud cases was based on a review of AAERs, the findings are
potentially biased by the enforcement strategies employed by the staff of the SEC.
Because the SEC is faced with constrained resources, there is the possibility that not all
cases of identified fraud occurring in the U.S. were addressed in the AAERs. There may
be a heavier concentration of companies contained in the AAERs where the SEC
assessed the probability of a successful finding of financial statement fraud as high.
Also, the SEC may choose to conduct “sweeps” of particular industries or types of
transactions, which may impact the distribution of fraud instances reported in AAERs.
Publicly-traded partnerships, broker-dealers, and unit investment trusts were excluded from this study.
We did not include other violations of laws whose only consequence gave rise to a potential contingent
liability (e.g., an “indirect effect illegal act” such as a violation of Environmental Protection Agency
regulations).
5
6
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In addition, the cases contained in the AAERs represent instances where the SEC alleged
the presence of financial statement fraud. In most instances, the company and/or
individuals named neither admitted nor denied guilt. To the extent that enforcement
biases are present, the results of this study are limited. However, given no better
publicly-available source of alleged financial statement fraud instances, we believe that
this approach was optimal under the circumstances. Furthermore, any SEC fraud
investigation is a significant event in the life of the affected company and individuals
involved in the financial reporting process, including boards of directors and auditors.
Thus, insight as to fraud occurrences investigated by the SEC is informative, regardless
of any inherent biases that may be present in how the SEC selects its enforcement cases.
For purposes of this report, the term “fraudulent financial reporting” represents
the intentional material misstatement of financial statements or financial disclosures
(in notes to the financial statements or SEC filings) or the perpetration of an illegal act
that has a material direct effect on the financial statements or financial disclosures. The
term financial statement fraud was distinguished from other causes of materially
misleading financial statements, such as unintentional errors and other corporate
improprieties that do not necessarily cause material inaccuracies in financial
statements. Throughout this report, references to fraudulent financial reporting are all
in the context of material misstatements. Our study excludes restatements of financial
statements due to errors or earnings management activities that did not result in a
violation of the federal antifraud securities provisions.
The team’s reading of AAERs during this period allowed us to develop a
comprehensive list of companies investigated by the SEC during 1998-2007 for alleged
financial statement fraud. The Team read 1,759 AAERs, beginning with AAER #1004
and ending with AAER #2762. From this process, we identified 347 companies (1,335
total AAERs for these 347 companies) involved in alleged instances of fraudulent
financial reporting. For each of these companies, we accumulated information about the
specific securities law violation to ensure that
the case involved an alleged violation of Rule
SEC AAERs issued from 199810(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or
2007
addressed 347 instances of
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act.
fraudulent financial reporting.

For each of the 347 companies, the team
collected extensive information to create a comprehensive database of company and
management characteristics surrounding instances of financial statement fraud from
(a) AAERs related to the alleged fraud, (b) databases containing selected financial
statement data reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the alleged
financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged fraud
period, and (d) databases of business press articles written about the sample
companies after the fraud was revealed, as well as about the no-fraud control firms.
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Data Obtained from AAERs
The team read all AAERs issued during 1998-2007 related to the alleged financial
statement fraud for each of the sample companies. In many cases, several AAERs
related to a single fraud at one company. From the reading, the team attempted to
capture the following information:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

A list of the specific annual financial statements (contained in Form 10-Ks) or
quarterly financial statements (contained in Form 10-Qs) fraudulently misstated
and other filings with the SEC (e.g., S-1 registration statements) that
incorporated fraudulently misstated financial statements. From this, we were
able to determine the length of time the alleged fraud occurred.
A brief description of the nature of the fraud allegations including a description
of how the fraud was allegedly perpetrated.
The dollar amounts of the fraud and the primary accounts affected.
Identification of types of personnel and outsiders involved in the fraud.
An indication of the alleged motivation for committing the fraud.
The industry in which the company operated.
A summary of the reported outcome of the SEC’s investigation, including
disciplinary action against senior management personnel.

Audited Financial Statement Data
We obtained selected audited financial statement data from annual financial statements
filed in a Form 10-K with the SEC. We used Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT®
database to obtain selected balance sheet and income statement amounts from the
audited financial statements included in the Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the fiscal
period preceding the first known instance of fraudulently misstated financial
statements for each of the sample companies (“last clean financial statements”). This
provided us information about the financial position and results of operations in the
period just before the period in which the fraud allegedly first occurred.
We also obtained from COMPUSTAT® the name of the audit firm responsible for
auditing the financial statements issued during the fraud period and the nature of the
auditor’s opinion on those financial statements. If the fraud period extended more than
one fiscal year, we obtained the name of the audit firm and the type of audit opinion
issued for the last fiscal year of the fraud period.
Data Obtained from Proxy Statements
We obtained copies of the first proxy statement sent to shareholders during the period
in which the alleged financial statement fraud was in process. We reviewed these proxy
statements to gather information about the characteristics of the board of directors and
its audit and compensation committees (composition, number of meetings, etc.) that
were in place during the fraud period.
www.coso.org

Page 19

Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies

Data from Business Press Articles
To obtain information about consequences for the company, senior management, and
board members subsequent to the revelation of the financial statement fraud, we
performed an extensive search of the Factiva database of financial press articles. Among
the many news sources included in Factiva are over 5,000 newspapers, journals, and
magazines, including The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Financial Times,
and The Economist, and over 500 newswires including Dow Jones, Reuters, PR
Newswire, and The Associated Press.
For each fraud, we performed a search for subsequent consequences to the
company, senior management, and board members using a series of key word search
strings. Our search began with the first day of the last fiscal year in which the fraud
occurred, and ended on the last day of the fiscal year ending two fiscal years after the
fiscal year in which the last AAER related to the fraud was issued.
We reviewed each instance where an article or press release was identified as a
result of the application of key word search strings. We captured information about
whether the company had experienced financial difficulty to the point of filing for
bankruptcy, being placed in conservatorship, or liquidating. We also determined
whether the company was delisted from a national stock exchange or a national
securities association, or engaged in a material asset sale (including a sale of the
company). We also captured information about the consequences of the alleged fraud
for senior management and members of the board of directors, including resignation,
termination, and other turnover. In addition, we captured whether members of senior
management were criminally indicted and convicted. Finally, to examine abnormal
stock price effects linked to public disclosures of the alleged fraud, we captured the first
public disclosure that suggested that material accounting improprieties may have
occurred, and the first public disclosure of an SEC or Department of Justice
investigation.
Data Limitations
Readers should recognize that, despite the best efforts to collect complete data for all
sample companies, the data sources used were often incomplete, and sometimes
inconsistent. For example, AAERs were uneven in their level of disclosure, and other
sources (e.g., Form 10-Ks, proxies, etc.) sometimes were not available. Additionally, the
analysis is limited by the accuracy and completeness of information that is reported in
these sources.
In addition to data availability issues, readers should also recognize that a great
deal of professional judgment was necessary when collecting, categorizing, and
synthesizing the data. Written summaries prepared from our analysis of the data
obtained from the AAERs comprise several thousand pages of text, and the team
incurred over 10,000 hours to gather and summarize the data underlying this study. We
www.coso.org
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believe that we have been reasonable and consistent in our judgments, but the research
approach was limited by the quality of our judgments.
Finally, the authors and research managers performed a great deal of data
review to ensure the quality of the team’s efforts. Much of the team’s work was
subjected to layers of reperformance, review, and reasonableness testing to promote
sound and consistent data collection and summarization.
Given the various limitations above, we encourage readers to view the results as
sound approximations of the underlying reality. With the large number of individuals
on the team involved, and with the need for a large amount of professional judgment
due to the nature of the underlying data, the results of the study should be viewed as
providing a broad profile of fraudulent financial reporting during this period rather
than perfectly precise dollar amounts or percentages for all data points included in this
monograph.
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III. Detailed Analysis of Instances of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1998-2007
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial reporting reported by the SEC in AAERs
issued between January 1998 and December 2007. After reading 1,759 AAERs, we
identified 347 companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial
reporting.7 In most instances, these fraud cases represent allegations of financial
statement fraud made by the SEC without the company and/or individuals named in the
AAER admitting guilt.
This section contains the findings from our reading of (a) AAERs related to each
of the 347 companies, (b) databases containing selected financial statement data
reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the alleged financial
statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged fraud period,
and (d) databases of business press articles written about the sample companies after
the fraud was disclosed. This section contains extensive information about each of the
following items:







Nature of the companies involved
Characteristics of the alleged fraud perpetrators
Nature of the frauds
Board governance characteristics, including the nature of the audit committee and
compensation committee
Issues related to the external auditor
Consequences to fraud companies and perpetrators subsequent to discovery

To examine whether certain board governance characteristics and whether
certain events affecting fraud firms subsequent to the revelation of a fraud event are
unique to fraud companies, we gathered a sample of similar no-fraud firms to examine
whether differences exist between fraud firms and no-fraud firms. Our methodology for
selecting and evaluating information related to no-fraud firms is described later in this
document in the section “Board Governance Characteristics.”

Generally there were multiple Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) related to the
fraud at a single company.
7
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NATURE OF COMPANIES INVOLVED
Financial Profile of Sample Companies
We were able to obtain the last clean financial statements for 313 of the 347 sample
companies.8 Table 1 highlights selected financial statement information for these fraud
companies.
While total assets, total revenues, and stockholder’s equity averaged $5.772
billion, $2.557 billion, and $1.001 billion, respectively, the median of total assets was
$93.1 million, the median of total revenues was
$72.4 million, and the median of stockholder’s
Fraud companies’ median
equity was $39.5 million in the period before
assets and revenues were
the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total
under $100 million in the
assets of $674 million, total revenues of $466
year preceding the first fraud
million, and stockholder’s equity of $242
period.
million, most of the sample companies operated
under the $500 million size range.9
Fraud affected companies of all sizes. Fraud companies ranged from startups
with no assets or revenues to companies with just under $400 billion in assets or over
$100 billion in revenues. Similarly, stockholders’ equity ranged from negative equity of
over $1 billion to positive equity of over $53 billion. However, the typical size of the
fraud companies noted above is substantially larger than the fraud companies in COSO’s
1999 study.
The sample companies in the 1999 study had total assets, total revenues, and
stockholder’s equity that averaged $533 million, $233 million, and $86 million,
respectively. The median of total assets in the 1999 study was only $15.7 million, the
median of total revenues was only $13 million, and the median of stockholder’s equity
was only $5 million in the period before the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total
assets of $74 million, total revenues of $53 million, and stockholder’s equity of $17
million, most of the sample fraud companies in the 1999 study operated well under the
$100 million size range, which is substantially smaller than the sample fraud companies
from the current study, even considering the effects of inflation.

Our primary source of previously issued financial statements was the COMPUTSTAT ® database. There
were slight differences in availability of certain financial statement items. Thus, we were unable to locate
each data item for all of the 313 sample companies available on COMPUTSTAT ®, as shown in the last row
of Table 1.
9 Because some high-profile frauds involving very large companies (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, etc.) are
included in this ten-year period, the means are inflated. Therefore, we winsorized the sample by setting
all observations above the 95th percentile to equal the value for the observation at the 95 th percentile. The
winsorized means were $1.9 billion for total assets, $1.6 billion for revenues, $478 million for
stockholders equity, $49 million for net income, and $84 million for cash flow from operations.
8
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Some of the sample companies were financially stressed in the period preceding
the fraud period. The median net income was only $875,000, with the 25th percentile
facing net losses of nearly $2.1 million. The 75th percentile had net income just over $18
million in the year before the fraud allegedly began. Similarly, cash flow from
operations averaged $246 million, while median cash flow from operations was only
$317,000. This closeness to breakeven positions was consistent with what was
observed in COSO’s 1999 study.
Table 1 – Financial Profile of Sample Companies
Last Financial Statements Prior to Beginning of Fraud Period

Total Assets

Revenues

Stockholders’
Equity
(Deficit)

Net Income
(Loss)

Cash Flow
From
Operations

(in $000s)
Mean

$5,771,693

$2,557,298

$1,000,508

$140,097

$246,332

$93,112

$72,360

$39,457

$875

$317

($1,021,747) ($2,687,000)

($1,214,000)

Median
Minimum
value
1st quartile

$0

$(23)

$14,806

$9,468

$4,765

($2,136)

($2,007)

3rd quartile

$673,805

$465,870

$242,261

$18,090

$37,384

Maximum
value
Companies

$391,673,000

$128,313,000

$53,206,590

$8,897,000

$16,654,000

313

311

312

311

303

National Stock Exchange Listing
We reviewed the last clean financial statements and CRSP database to identify the
national stock exchange where each company’s stock traded. We were able to identify
the stock exchange listing for 313 of the 347 sample companies. As indicated by the pie
chart in Table 2, most (50 percent) were traded on the NASDAQ exchange. Twentythree percent of the companies’ stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and four
percent of the companies’ stock traded on the American Stock Exchange. Finally, 23
percent of the companies’ stock traded on electronic bulletin boards, pink sheets, and
other over-the-counter markets.
According to the 2006 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies (Advisory Committee 2006), approximately 19.5 percent of all publiclytraded companies are registered on the New York Stock Exchange, 5.7 percent are
registered on the American Stock Exchange, and 24.2 percent trade in the NASDAQ
National Market or NASDAQ Capital Market. The remainder trade on the over-thewww.coso.org
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counter bulletin boards (22.6 percent ) or pink sheets (28.0 percent). Thus, the mix of
fraud firms trading in NASDAQ markets (50 percent) is higher than the overall profile of
public companies on NASDAQ (24 percent).
Table 2 – Sample Companies’ National Stock Exchange Listing
(n = 313 with Available Information)

The percentage of companies (73 percent) whose stock traded on any over-the-counter
market (NASDAQ, electronic bulletin boards, pink sheets, etc.) was in line with the 78
percent of companies in the 1999 COSO study whose stock traded on any of the overthe-counter markets. The percentage of companies in COSO’s 1999 study whose stock
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (15 percent) or American Stock Exchange (7
percent) also was fairly similar to the present study.
Industries for Companies Involved
We reviewed the information included in the AAERs to determine the primary industry
in which the fraud companies operated. Similar to our findings in the 1999 COSO study,
the two most frequent industries cited were computer hardware and software (20
percent) and other manufacturing (20 percent). Other frequently-cited industries in the
current study were healthcare/health products (11 percent), retailers/wholesalers (9
percent), other service providers (7 percent), and telecommunications (7 percent). See
the pie chart in Table 3.
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Table 3 – Primary Industries of Sample Fraud Companies

Geographic Location of Sample Companies
We reviewed the AAERs to identify the geographic location of the fraud companies.
Most of the frauds were committed at or directed from the companies’ headquarters
locations. We were able to identify the headquarters location for 329 of the 347 fraud
companies. Table 4 contains information about the frequency of cases for states in
which at least 10 fraud companies were located. Similar to sample fraud companies
examined in COSO’s 1999 study, the highest percentages of frauds involved companies
headquartered in California and New York. In the current study, the most fraud
companies were located in California (19 percent of the fraud cases), New York (10
percent), Texas (7 percent), Florida (7 percent), New Jersey (5 percent), Massachusetts
(4 percent), and Illinois (4 percent). This pattern is consistent with centers of business
activity in the U.S.
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Table 4 – Locations of Fraud Companies
(n = 329 with Available Information)

ALLEGED FRAUD PERPETRATORS
Individuals Named in the AAERs
From our reading of the AAERs, we captured information about the types of company
representatives and outsiders named in an AAER related to each instance of alleged
fraudulent financial reporting. We captured names of all individuals listed in any of the
AAERs related to an instance of fraudulent financial reporting, whether these
individuals were charged with fraud or charged with other lesser violations. The SEC
named in the AAERs individuals involved in the alleged fraud for 342 of the 347 fraud
companies. Even though these individuals were named in an AAER, there was no
certain evidence that all the named participants violated the antifraud statutes, and
other individuals not named in an AAER may have been involved in the fraud. In
addition, most of the named participants neither admitted nor denied guilt of any kind.
Using the highest managerial title for an individual, we summarized the typical
employee positions named in the AAER. For example,
if one individual had the titles of chief financial officer
The CEO and/or CFO were
(CFO) and controller, we reported that as involving
named in an AAER for 89
strictly the CFO position in our reporting in Table 5
percent of the fraud
below. As noted in Table 5, the senior executive most
companies.
frequently named in an AAER was the chief executive
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officer (CEO). The CEO was named as one of the parties involved in 246 of 342 fraud
companies, representing 72 percent of the sample companies with available
information. The second most frequently identified senior executive was the CFO. The
CFO was named in 222 of the 342 fraud companies, which represents 65 percent of the
companies involved. When considered together, the CEO and/or CFO were named in
305 of the 342 (89 percent) of the cases.
Table 5 – Types and Frequencies of Individuals Named in AAERs
100%
90%

Types and Frequencies of Individuals
Named AAERs

80%
70%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

Current Study
COSO's 1999 Study

10%
0%

Note: In many cases the AAERs cited board members for their involvement in the fraud. The vast majority of
these individuals appeared to be company managers serving on the board, including CEOs serving as Board
Chair.

The company controller was named in 115 of the 342 frauds, representing 34
percent of the fraud instances. The chief operating officer (COO) was named in 10
percent of the frauds (35 of 342), and other vice presidents were named in 129 of the
342 frauds (38 percent of the cases). Lower level personnel were named in 23 percent
of the cases (80 of 342 fraud instances). Recall that our classification scheme tracked
the highest named position for an individual. Thus, the noted percentages associated
with less senior positions may be understated. In addition, because of the relatively
small size of some of the fraud firms in this sample, some of the noted positions (e.g.,
COO) may not have been filled. Finally, SEC enforcement actions may target top
executives more frequently than lower level employees. These factors may contribute
to the lower percentages noted for these positions.
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The frequency with which the AAERs name the CEO as being allegedly involved
in the fraud was the same (72 percent of fraud companies) for the current study and the
1999 COSO study. However, the frequency with which the AAERs named the CEO
and/or CFO in the current study (89 percent) is slightly higher than in the 1999 COSO
study (83 percent). In addition, the CFO was approximately 50 percent more likely to be
subject to an SEC enforcement action in the current study than in the 1999 study
(named in 65 percent of cases in the current study, versus 43 percent of cases in COSO’s
1999 study). Finally, the frequency with which the SEC named other individuals in the
AAERs was generally higher in the current study as compared to the 1999 COSO study.
In addition to the results in Table 5, individuals named in the AAERs extended
beyond company executives. In 81 of the 342 fraud companies (24 percent of the cases),
outsiders were named, generally customers and vendors. The external auditor was
named in the AAER for 78 of the 342 fraud companies (23 percent of the fraud cases
with information about perpetrators), and members of the audit committee were
named in 7 of the 342 fraud companies (2 percent of the cases).
Alleged Motivation for the Fraud
In some instances, the SEC provided discussion in the AAERs about the alleged
motivation for the fraud. Because the SEC did not consistently describe the alleged
motivations in each fraud instance and there were often multiple motivations for a
single fraud, we do not provide summary statistics about the rate of particular
motivations. However, among those noted, the most commonly cited reasons
summarized by the SEC in the AAERs include committing the fraud to –








Meet external earnings expectations of analysts and others
Meet internally set financial targets or make the company look better
Conceal the company’s deteriorating financial condition
Increase the stock price
Bolster financial position for pending equity or debt financing
Increase management compensation through achievement of bonus targets and
through enhanced stock appreciation
Cover up assets misappropriated for personal gain
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NATURE OF THE FRAUDS
Total Amount of the Fraud
In an attempt to obtain a judgmental measure of the typical size of the financial
statement frauds, we accumulated information from the AAERs that provided some
indication of the amounts involved. In many cases, the AAERs did not disclose the dollar
amounts involved. As a result, we were only able to obtain some measure of the dollar
amounts involved for 300 of the 347 fraud companies. As reported in Table 6, the
average fraud involved $397.68 million of cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation over the fraud period, while the median fraud involved $12.05
million.10 The smallest fraud was $47,200,
while the largest totaled $25.8 billion.11 The
The average cumulative
first and third quartiles of cumulative
misstatement
amount was
misstatements or misappropriations were
$397.68 million, while the
$3.65
million
and
$55.95
million,
median cumulative
12
respectively. The wide variance between the
misstatement was $12.05
mean and median fraud amounts is due to a
million.
few large high-profile frauds during the
period, such as the frauds at Enron and
WorldCom.
Table 6 – Cumulative Dollar Amount of Fraud for a Single Company
# of Sample
Companies
with
Information
Cumulative amount of fraud
for a single company

300

Mean Cumulative
Median Cumulative
Misstatement or
Misstatement or
Misappropriation
Misappropriation
(in $ millions)
$397.68
$12.05

Minimum = $47,200; Maximum = $25.8 billion
1st quartile = $3.65 million; 3rd quartile = $55.95 million

To evaluate the impact of large outliers, we winsorized the data by setting the cumulative misstatement
or misappropriation amount for those frauds above the 95th percentile to be equal to the value for the
95th percentile. The winsorized average was $203.7 million.
11 For two high-profile frauds, Royal Ahold and WorldCom, the cumulative fraud amounts provided in the
AAERs were somewhat lower than amounts we noticed in either an SEC press release or in media
descriptions of the case. For consistency, in Table 6 we always used the amounts presented in the AAERs,
rather than including any larger fraud amounts discussed in press releases or media stories.
12 Ideally, we would report misstatement information in percentage rather than dollar terms. However,
we are unable to report percentages for most companies due to the limited amount of information
provided in the AAERs about dollar misstatements and the lack of available financial statements for all
fraud periods (which reflect misstated values anyway) for those companies with AAERs reporting
misstatement information.
10
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The size of the cumulative misstatement or misappropriation in the current
study was substantially larger than the cumulative misstatement or misappropriation
summarized in COSO’s 1999 study. For the sample fraud companies in the 1999 COSO
study, the average cumulative misstatement was only $25.0 million, while the median
cumulative misstatement was $4.1 million. The first and third quartiles of cumulative
misstatements or misappropriations for the 1999 COSO study were $1.6 million and
$11.76 million, respectively.
For the period 1998-2007, the total cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation was nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available
information. This large total is driven by the numerous large company frauds of the
early 2000s, including Enron, WorldCom, and others. It is clear that the magnitude of
the fraud cases was much greater in 1998-2007 than in 1987-1997.
Unfortunately, the AAERs do not consistently report the dollar amounts involved
in each fraud. In some instances, the AAERs report the dollar amounts of the fraud by
noting the extent to which assets were misstated. In other cases, the AAERs report the
amounts that revenues, net income, pre-tax income, or other items were misstated. We
used the nature of the data presented in the AAER to develop a reasonable measure of
the fraud amount; however, we caution the reader that a great deal of judgment was
used. In addition, this analysis was dependent on which figures the SEC chose to
disclose in the AAERs. Accordingly, the categories and figures below should be viewed
as reasonable estimates of fraud amounts (i.e., not exact point estimates). Information
about the amounts involved by fraud type is provided below in Table 7.
Asset misstatements averaged $226.74 million, with a median of $7.9 million.
The average misstatements of revenues, expenses, pre-tax income, and net income
ranged from $91.44 million to $958.98 million, with medians ranging from $10.2
million to $21.5 million. The average misappropriation of assets (i.e., theft of assets)
was $16.3 million, while the median misappropriation of assets was $4.0 million.
Table 7 – Dollar Amount of Misstatements by Fraud Type

Misstatement Type
Assets
Revenue or gain
Expense
Pre-tax income
Net income
Misappropriation of assets

# of Fraud
Companies with
Information
44
132
26
20
36
15

Mean
Median
Cumulative
Cumulative
Misstatement
Misstatement
(in $ millions)
$226.74
$7.9
$455.04
$10.3
$91.44
$19.8
$958.98
$21.5
$525.21
$10.2
$16.30
$4.0

Note: See Table 1 for the typical size of the companies involved.
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While Tables 6 and 7 provide some information about the average and median
cumulative effects of the fraud over the entire fraud period, Table 8 provides an
overview of the largest income misstatement in a single period. For each of the
companies where the related AAERs reported misstatement information as a function
of pre-tax income or net income, we identified the largest single-year or single-quarter
misstatement over that company’s fraud period. For the AAERs providing misstatement
information relative to pre-tax income (information provided for 66 companies), the
average of the largest pre-tax misstatement in a single period was $101.6 million, with a
median single period pre-tax misstatement of $6.75 million. This was substantially
larger than in COSO’s 1999 study, which reported an average pre-tax income
misstatement of $7.1 million and median pre-tax income misstatement of $3.2 million.
For AAERs reporting misstatements as a function of net income (105 companies), the
average largest single period misstatement of net income was $90.4 million with a
median single period net income misstatement of $5.0 million.13 This was also
substantially larger than the average and median largest single period net income
misstatement of $9.9 million and $2.2 million, respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999
study.
Table 8 – Largest Single Period Income Misstatement

Description

Number of Fraud
Companies with
Information

Information reported as a function
of pre-tax income

66

Information reported as a function
of net income

105

Mean Largest
Median Largest
Single Year or
Single Year or
Quarter
Quarter
Misstatement
Misstatement
(in $ millions)
$101.6
$6.75
$90.4

$5.0

Timing of Fraud Period
For the 347 instances of fraudulent financial reporting, the related fraudulently
misstated financial statements were issued in calendar years beginning before 1990
and extending through 2006. The years with the greatest number of misstatements
were 1997-2001, with over 100 companies misstating their financials in each of these
years. Due to the time lag in SEC enforcement, the vast majority of the misstated
periods were before the passage of SOX in 2002. Only 61 of the 347 fraud companies
examined in this study had fraudulently misstated financial statements involving
periods subsequent to 2002. Only a small number of those involved companies subject
to the reporting provisions of Section 404 of SOX.

The winsorized means (set equal to the 95th percentile value) were $54.3 million for pre-tax income
and $38.0 million for net income.
13
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Typical Length of Problem Period
The financial statement frauds generally involved multiple fiscal periods. Information to
determine the number of months from the beginning of the first fraud period to the end
of the last fraud period was available for all of the 347 sample companies. Fraud
periods extended on average for 31.4 months, with the median fraud period extending
24 months. This was slightly longer than the average and median fraud periods of 23.7
months and 21 months, respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 study. Many of the frauds
began with misstatements of interim financial
statements that were continued in annual financial
The typical length of the
statement filings. Only 44 of the 347 companies (13
fraud period was two
percent) issued fraudulent financial statements involving
years.
a period of less than twelve months. The longest problem
period was 180 months (and it was 168 months for two
other companies).
Methods of Fraudulently Reporting Financial Statement Information
Based upon information included in the AAERs, we made our best attempt to identify
the methods used to fraudulently report the financial statement information. As noted
in Table 9, the two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate financial
statement information involved overstating revenues and assets. Sixty-one percent of
the 347 fraud companies recorded revenues inappropriately, primarily by creating
fictitious revenue transactions or by recording revenues prematurely. This was a higher
rate of revenue misstatements than the 50 percent found in COSO’s 1999 study.
Fraudulent misstatement of
financial statements frequently
involved the overstatement of
revenues and assets. Intentional
misstatement of financial
statements was noted much
more frequently than
misappropriation of assets.

Fifty-one percent of the 347 fraud
companies overstated assets, primarily by
overvaluing existing assets or capitalizing items
that should have been expensed.14 Thirty-one
percent of the 347 companies’ financial
statements were misstated through the
understatement of expenses or liabilities. That
rate was higher than the 18 percent found in
COSO’s 1999 study.

To avoid double-counting, the information about the overstatement of assets does not include
overstatements of accounts receivable due to the revenue recognition frauds.
14
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Table 9 – Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques

Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements

Percentage of the 347
Fraud Companies Using
Fraud Method a

Improper revenue recognition:
Recording fictitious revenues – 48%
Recording revenues prematurely – 35%
No description/“overstated” – 2%

61%

Overstatement of assets (excluding accounts receivable
overstatements due to revenue fraud):
Overstating existing assets or capitalizing
expenses – 46%
Recording fictitious assets or assets not
owned – 11%

51%

Understatement of expenses/liabilities

31%

Misappropriation of assets

14%

Inappropriate disclosure (with no financial statement line
item effects)

1%

Other miscellaneous techniques (acquisitions, joint
ventures, netting of amounts, etc.)

20%

Disguised through use of related party transactions

18%

Insider trading also cited

24%

a

The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the
category totals due to multiple types of fraud employed at a single company. Also, because the
financial statement frauds at the sample companies often involved more than one fraud technique,
the sum of the percentages reported exceeds 100 percent.

Most of the financial statement fraud instances involved intentionally misstating
financial statement information, with only 14 percent of the fraud cases involving
misappropriation of company assets (i.e., theft of assets). This was consistent with
earlier findings in COSO’s 1999 study that 12 percent of the fraud cases involved
misappropriation of assets and in the 1987 Report of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting that 13 percent of the cases against public companies
involved misappropriation of assets.
As noted in Table 9, over 60 percent of the sample companies overstated
revenues. The revenue misstatements were primarily due to recording revenues
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fictitiously or prematurely by employing a variety of techniques that include the
following:


Sham sales. To conceal the fraud, company representatives often falsified inventory
records, shipping records, and invoices. In some cases, the company recorded sales
for goods merely shipped to another company location. In other cases, the company
pretended to ship goods to appear as if a sale occurred and then hid the related
inventory, which was never shipped to customers, from company auditors.



Conditional sales. These transactions were recorded as revenues even though the
sales involved unresolved contingencies or the terms of the sale were amended
subsequently by side letter agreements, which often eliminated the customer’s
obligation to keep the merchandise.



Round-tripping or recording loans as sales. Some companies recorded sales by
shipping goods to alleged customers and then providing funds to the customers to
pay back to the company. In other cases, companies recorded loan proceeds as
revenues.



Bill and hold transactions. Several companies improperly recorded sales from bill
and hold transactions that did not meet the criteria for revenue recognition.



Premature revenues before all the terms of the sale were completed. Generally
this involved recording sales after the goods were ordered but before they were
shipped to the customer.



Improper cutoff of sales. To increase revenues, the accounting records were held
open beyond the balance sheet date to record sales of the subsequent accounting
period in the current period.



Improper use of the percentage of completion method. Revenues were
overstated by accelerating the estimated percentage of completion for projects in
process.



Unauthorized shipments. Revenues were overstated by shipping goods never
ordered by the customer or by shipping defective products and recording revenues
at full, rather than discounted, prices.



Consignment sales. Revenues were recorded for consignment shipments or
shipments of goods for customers to consider on a trial basis.
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We do not report percentages for each of the above types of fraudulent revenue
schemes because the language used by the SEC to describe fraud techniques varied
extensively, making it difficult to classify the various types in exact ways. Thus, it was
difficult to categorize reliably the frequency of a specific revenue recognition fraud
technique.15
Also, in several instances, company representatives were able to falsify
confirmation responses directly or indirectly by convincing third parties to alter the
confirmation response. In other cases, company personnel created a variety of false
documents.
Over half of the sample companies misstated the financial statement information
by overstating assets. Table 10 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by
sample companies. Even excluding the effects of misstating accounts receivable due to
the revenue recognition frauds, the two most common asset accounts misstated were
inventory (51 cases) and accounts receivable (43 cases). Other asset accounts misstated
included property, plant, and equipment (24 cases); cash/marketable securities (19
cases); loans/notes receivable/mortgages (13 cases); investments (12 cases); and
prepaid expenses (11 cases).

There are many rich examples of alleged revenue frauds using the methods listed above. Interested
readers may consult the following AAERs for illustrative examples of many of these methods. These
AAERs were haphazardly selected from numerous possible examples, and there is no intent to highlight
any particular company or individual. Rather, these AAERs simply provide interesting insights into
alleged revenue fraud methods.
AAER 1422 - www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7994.htm
AAER 1559 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17522.htm
AAER 2200 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19121.htm and related complaint at
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19121.pdf
AAER 2126 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18935.htm and related complaint at
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18935.pdf
AAER 2451 - www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8716.pdf
15
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Table 10 – Number of Fraud Cases With Asset Accounts Misstated

Number of Cases With Asset Accounts
Misstated
60
50
40

30
20
10

0
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BOARD GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS
A large body of accounting research examines the relation between board governance
characteristics and accounting outcomes (for example, see Cohen et al. 2004; DeZoort et
al. 2002). To contribute to our understanding of the relation between the presence of
fraud and board governance characteristics, we gathered information on the board of
directors and on the audit and compensation committees from company proxy
statements filed with the SEC. Because we were interested in the governance
characteristics in place at the time the fraud began, we gathered governance data based
on who was on the board and on the board committees during the first fraud year by
examining the proxy statements filed with the SEC in the first year of the fraud. We
were able to locate proxies for 203 of the 347 fraud companies.16 We also gathered data
on board leadership issues disclosed by the company in the proxy statement (e.g.,
whether the same individual served as both CEO and chairman of the board, whether
the company’s founder was on the board, etc.) and whether there were disclosures of
related party transactions.
To analyze whether certain governance characteristics were associated with a
higher incidence of fraud, we gathered a sample of 203 no-fraud companies that is
similar to the 203 fraud companies with available proxy information. Our goal was to
compare the board governance characteristics of the fraud companies with similar
companies apparently not engaging in fraud to identify whether certain board
governance characteristics differed between fraud and no-fraud firms.
For each fraud company, we selected a similar no-fraud company. First, the fraud
and no-fraud pairs are traded on the same stock exchange. For example, if the fraud
company was traded on NASDAQ, the no-fraud company was selected from NASDAQ to
control for differences in governance characteristics across exchanges. Second, the
proxy data are gathered from corresponding time periods (i.e., to control for differences
in governance characteristics across time). Third, the industries of the fraud and nofraud samples are similar (based on the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) codes), so as to
control for any variations in governance characteristics across industries.
Finally, after the first three constraints, we attempted to make the size of the
fraud and no-fraud companies as similar as possible, since larger companies are
expected to have more advanced governance mechanisms due to their greater
resources. Achieving similar size was the most challenging, as the other three
constraints were already in place. If we could not identify an appropriate no-fraud firm
whose market value of equity was within plus or minus 30 percent of the fraud firm’s
market value, we then measured size using total assets (plus or minus 30 percent).
Ultimately, the size of the fraud and no-fraud companies is within plus or minus 30
percent in over 75 percent of the cases. There are no significant differences in median
market value of equity or assets between fraud and no-fraud firms. Based on the
In some instances, the companies failed to file a proxy with the SEC. For others, the relevant proxy was
not available in electronic databases or via purchase through outside vendors.
16
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procedures described above, the samples of fraud and no-fraud companies are similar
and provide a reasonable basis for comparison.
Our sample period overlapped the widely recognized Report and
Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999), jointly issued in 1999 by the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. That report resulted in
several changes in stock exchange listing requirements related to board governance
implemented in 2000 by both the NYSE and NASDAQ. As a result, we partitioned our
analysis of the data into two sub-periods, 1991-1999 and 2001-2004, based on the first
fraud year for these 203 fraud companies.17 This allowed us to examine whether
linkages between certain board governance characteristics and fraud occurrences
continued subsequent to several changes in listing requirements related to board
governance.
The overarching insight from the analysis of differences in board characteristics
between fraud and no-fraud firms reported in the pages that follow is the lack of
notable statistical differences in many of the governance characteristics that have been
the focus of regulators, exchanges, and governance experts in the last several years.
Many board of director characteristics appear to no longer differ significantly between
fraud and no-fraud firms. And, in some instances, the noted differences are in directions
opposite of what might be expected. Furthermore, while some characteristics were
found to be statistically significant, many of those differences may lack any practical
significance (i.e., they may be too small to matter). While we report whether there are
statistical differences between fraud and no-fraud firm governance characteristics, we
leave the evaluation of practical significance to the reader.
These collective observations raise the possibility that there are other more
important governance characteristics or processes that affect the board’s ability to
assess the risk of financial statement fraud and oversee the implementation of
procedures to prevent, deter, and detect fraud.
Full Board of Director Characteristics
Board Size and Independence
Table 11 contains information about the size and composition of the full board of
directors. For each board characteristic in Table 11, we report the average for the fraud
firms and the average for the similar set of no-fraud firms for the full sample and for
While we studied AAERs issued by the SEC between 1998 and 2007, the calendar years in which these
203 frauds began were as early as 1991 and as late as 2004. In our sub-period analyses, we excluded
frauds occurring in 2000 because the BRC Report was issued in 1999 and the stock exchanges made
changes to their listing standards in 2000. Interestingly, though, more frauds began in 2000 (n = 38) than
in any other year. Thus, we re-ran our analyses including the year 2000 in the post sub-period (i.e., we
compared the 1991-1999 sub-period to the 2000-2004 sub-period as a sensitivity test). Our results were
very similar to those reported in this monograph.
17
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each of the sub-periods examined (1991-1999 and 2001-2004). We also report the
difference in averages between the fraud and no-fraud firms and report the results of
our statistical tests by providing the p-value results when those differences between
fraud and no-fraud firms were statistically significant.18 We conducted tests to
determine whether the differences between fraud and no-fraud firms were statistically
significant for both the full sample and the two sub-periods examined. Because the
sample sizes for each of the sub-periods examined were much smaller than the full
sample (especially for the 2001-2004 sub-period), the lack of statistical significance in
tests of each sub-period may be due to lack of statistical power due to the smaller
sample sizes. Thus, there may be differences in fraud and no-fraud firms that we cannot
statistically observe due to size limitations in each sub-sample.
For all board characteristics where we report a p-value less than 0.10, the
differences between fraud and no-fraud firms were interpreted to be statistically
significant, consistent with most research. If no p-value is reported for a particular
board characteristic, readers should conclude that fraud and no-fraud firms do not
differ significantly in that board characteristic. We use this reporting technique for all
tables where we report a statistical test of the difference between fraud and no-fraud
firms.
As shown in Table 11, the average fraud firm had 7.7 directors on the board as
compared to 8.0 directors for no-fraud firms. This difference was not statistically
significant.
A large body of academic research finds that board and audit committee
independence affects the effectiveness of board and audit committee oversight. We
examined the relation between board independence and fraud. In analyzing board
member independence, the following definitions were used to categorize individual
members of the board of directors into one of three categories:


Inside director – A director who was also an officer or employee of the
company or a subsidiary or an officer of an affiliated company.



Grey director – A director who was a former officer or employee of the
company, a subsidiary, or an affiliate; relative of management; professional
advisor to the company; officer or owner of a significant supplier or
customer of the company; interlocking director; officer or employee of
another company controlled by the CEO or the company’s majority owner;
owner of an affiliate company; or creditor of the company.



Outside director – A director who had no disclosed relationship (other than
stock ownership) between the director and the company or its officers.

We tested whether there was a statistical difference between the fraud sample and the no-fraud
sample for each variable. We report p-values for those differences that were statistically significant at
below the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
18
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The average percentage of inside directors on the board for fraud firms was 30
percent as compared to 25 percent for no-fraud firms. This difference was statistically
significant (p–value = 0.010). There was no significant difference in the percentage of
outside directors for fraud firms (60 percent of the board) versus no-fraud firms (63
percent of the board).
There was no statistical difference between the two groups in the average
percentage of grey directors. We were able to analyze the types of grey directors
serving on the board of directors for 63 fraud and 63 no-fraud firms. The most common
types of grey directors were former company
officers, consultants, and outside legal counsel.
Differences in types of grey directors serving on
While fraud firms had significantly
fraud and no-fraud firms were not statistically
more inside directors than no-fraud
significant, except for the difference in the
firms in the 1991-1999 sub-period,
percentage of grey directors who were relatives
this difference did not continue in
the 2001-2004 sub-period.
of management. Seven percent of fraud firm grey
directors were relatives of management as
compared to 18 percent for no-fraud firms (pvalue = 0.086).
When board independence was examined for the two sub-periods (1991-1999
and 2001-2004), we found that the results for the 1991-1999 sub-period were
generally consistent with the full sample results. That is, fraud firms had statistically
more inside directors than no-fraud firms for 1991-1999 (p-value = 0.069). We also
found that fraud firms were significantly more likely to have consultants as grey
directors (32 percent) than were no-fraud firms (14 percent) (p-value = 0.034).
However, the types of directors serving on boards in 2001-2004 were not statistically
different for fraud and no-fraud firms. Thus, differences in board composition following
the year 2000 may no longer be associated with the occurrence of fraudulent financial
reporting.
We found a decrease in the percentage of inside and grey directors on boards
between the two sub-periods for both fraud and no-fraud firms. For 1991-1999, 32
percent of the fraud firm boards were composed of inside directors as compared to only
25 percent of the fraud firm boards in 2001-2004. Consistent with that trend, the
percentage of outside directors on fraud firm boards increased from 56 percent in the
1991-1999 sub-period to 67 percent in the 2001-2004 sub-period. This was consistent
with a general shift in governance expectations over time that boards should have a
greater percentage of outside directors.19

We occasionally highlight shifts in overall trends by comparing findings from the 1991-1999 subperiod and findings from the 2001-2004 sub-period to provide insights about apparent changes in trends
over time. However, we have not performed formal statistical tests of noted differences between the two
sub-periods.
19
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Table 11 – Board of Director Composition (Means)

Number of board
members

203

7.7

8.0

-0.2

203
203
203

30%
10%
60%

25%
12%
63%

5%
-2%
-3%

Former company
officer
Relative of
management
Consultant to
company
Outside legal counsel

63

45%

57%

-12%

63

7%

18%

-11%

63

25%

16%

63

15%

Interlocking director

63

Banker

113

7.4

7.8

-0.4

113
113
113

32%
12%
56%

28%
13%
59%

4%
-1%
-3%

41

38%

52%

41

9%

9%

41

10%

5%

4%

4%

63

0%

Non-bank creditor

63

Officer of significant
supplier or customer

63

52

7.9

8.0

-0.1

52
52
52

25%
8%
67%

23%
11%
66%

2%
-3%
1%

-14%

13

62%

54%

8%

21%

-12%

13

4%

15%

-11%

32%

14%

18%

13

8%

8%

0%

41

15%

10%

5%

13

19%

15%

4%

0%

41

5%

6%

-1%

13

4%

0%

4%

0%

0%

41

0%

0%

0%

13

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

41

0%

0%

0%

13

0%

0%

0%

2%

0%

2%

41

2%

0%

2%

13

4%

0%

4%

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

2001-2004 Sample

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

p-value

1991-1999 Sample
Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample

Type of board member:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director
Type of grey directors:

0.010

0.086

0.069

0.034

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Board Member Age, Tenure, and Expertise
We also gathered data about specific characteristics of individuals who served on the
boards of the fraud and no-fraud firms. Results are reported in Table 12. The age of the
average board member was approximately the same for the fraud and no-fraud firms
(53.9 and 54.3 years of age, respectively).
Board members of fraud firms had served on the fraud company’s board for 6.7
years on average before the first year of the fraud, which was statistically lower than
the average of 7.7 years that directors of no-fraud firms served (p-value = 0.010). Thus,
individuals serving on the boards of fraud firms had fewer years of experience on that
board relative to individuals serving on no-fraud
firm boards.
While the average tenure of fraud
firm directors was significantly
lower than for no-fraud firms,
there may be little practical
significance in this difference.

Surprisingly, on average, 11 percent of
fraud firms’ board members had accounting or
finance expertise as compared to 9 percent for the
no-fraud firms, a difference that was statistically
significant (p-value = 0.052). More than half of the
firms in both the fraud and no-fraud groups had at least one accounting or financial
expert on the board (57 percent and 51 percent, respectively; these were not
statistically different).
We also examined each board member’s director experience by measuring how
many other directorships were held by each individual director. The average board
member served on one other corporate board (1.1 other directorships for individuals
serving on fraud firm boards, 0.9 other directorships for no-fraud firms). Also, only 16
percent of fraud firms and 15 percent of no-fraud firms had boards where not one
director served on any other corporate board. The difference between fraud and nofraud firms was not statistically significant.
The results in the two sub-periods (1991-1999 and 2001-2004) were generally
consistent with those reported above. Differences in director tenure were only
statistically significant for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.029). The length of
board tenure was not statistically different between fraud and no-fraud firms for 20012004. Also, the average percentage of directors with accounting or finance expertise
was higher for fraud firms (12 percent of the fraud firm board) than for no-fraud firms
(8 percent of the no-fraud firm board) in the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.017).
The percentage of boards with at least one director with accounting or financial
expertise was greater in the latter period, for both fraud and no-fraud firms. Also, the
chance that a board would have no members who sit on the board of another firm was
lower in the 2001-2004 sub-period, for both fraud and no-fraud firms.
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Table 12 – Individual Director Characteristics (Means)

54.2

53.6

0.6

6.7

7.7

-1.0

Percentage of board
members with accounting
or finance expertise

203

11%

9%

2%

Percentage of companies
with at least one
accounting or financial
expert on board

203

57%

51%

Average number of other
directorships held by
board members

203

1.1

Percentage of companies
where not one member of
the board held any other
directorships

203

16%

52

53.6

55.3

-1.7

0.010

113

6.7

7.8

-1.1

0.029

52

6.9

8.0

-1.1

0.052

113

12%

8%

4%

0.017

52

13%

11%

2%

6%

113

56%

47%

9%

52

67%

60%

7%

0.9

0.2

113

1.0

0.9

0.1

52

1.1

0.9

0.2

15%

1%

113

19%

22%

-3%

52

13%

10%

3%

p-value

203

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

Director tenure on board
(in years)

No-Fraud
Sample

113

Fraud Sample

-0.4

# of Pairs of
Firms

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

54.3

2001-2004 Sample

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

53.9

Fraud Sample

203

# of Pairs of
Firms

Director age

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

1991-1999 Sample

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Stock Ownership
We obtained data about the extent of company stock owned by directors and officers of
the company. Stock ownership information was available for 196 of the 203 pairs of
fraud and no-fraud firms. This information is reported in Table 13. Directors and
officers owned a significant percentage of the stock of both the fraud and no-fraud firms
(23 percent and 22 percent of outstanding common shares, respectively). On average,
the highest-ranking officer owned 9 percent of the
stock for both groups, and the largest stockholder
among the officers and directors owned 15 percent
There was no difference in stock
of the stock for fraud firms as compared to 13
ownership held by officers and
directors between fraud and nopercent for no-fraud firms. None of the differences
fraud firms.
was statistically significant. The results for the two
sub-periods are consistent with the full sample
results.
Board Chair and CEO Age and Tenure
We gathered data about certain characteristics of the individuals serving as board chair
and as CEO. The results are reported in Table 13. We collected data about the type of
director serving as the chairman of the board for 182 of the 203 pairs of fraud and nofraud firms. The chairman of the board was an inside director in over 70 percent of both
fraud and no-fraud firms (75 percent of fraud firms and 70 percent of no-fraud firms
had an inside director as chairman). This likely reflects the prevalence in the U.S. of
assigning both the position of CEO and board chair to the same individual. Interestingly,
the percentage of firms whose chairman of the board was a grey director was 11
percent for fraud firms as compared to 19 percent for no-fraud firms, a difference that
is statistically significant (p-value = 0.039). That result was also statistically significant
for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.046).
We found that, on average, the CEO was approximately 51 years old for both
fraud and no-fraud firms. CEO tenure, which reflects the number of years the individual
had served as CEO of the firm, was approximately 10 years for both fraud and no-fraud
firms (9.4 years for fraud firms, 10.2 years for no-fraud firms). These results were not
statistically different for the full sample. However, the average age of CEOs in the 20012004 sub-period was 49.9 years old for fraud firms as compared to 53.2 years old for
no-fraud firms. The difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.051). Similarly,
the average CEO tenure was statistically lower for fraud firms relative to no-fraud firms
for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value = 0.098).
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Table 13 – Stock Ownership by Directors and Officers; Board Chair and CEO Traits (Means)

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

23%

22%

1%

107

24%

23%

1%

52

18%

21%

-3%

Stock owned by the
highest-ranking officer

196

9%

9%

0%

107

11%

10%

1%

52

7%

7%

0%

Stock owned by the
largest holder among
officers and directors

196

15%

13%

2%

107

17%

14%

3%

52

12%

13%

-1%

182
182
182

75%
11%
14%

70%
19%
11%

5%
-8%
3%

99
99
99

80%
7%
13%

76%
16%
8%

4%
-9%
5%

48
48
48

64%
17%
19%

56%
25%
19%

8%
-8%
0%

CEO age (in years)

203

50.7

51.4

-0.7

113

51.7

50.6

1.1

52

49.9

53.2

-3.3

0.051

CEO tenure (in years)

203

9.4

10.2

-0.8

113

10.1

10.2

-0.1

52

8.3

11.1

-2.8

0.098

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

196

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

Stock owned by directors
and officers

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

2001-2004 Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

# of Pairs of
Firms

1991-1999 Sample

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample

Type of board chair:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director

0.039

0.046

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Number of Board Meetings Per Year
We gathered data about the number of board meetings held during the year. That
information is reported in Table 14. Perhaps surprisingly, boards of fraud firms met
significantly more often (7.7 meetings per year) than boards of no-fraud firms (6.6
meetings per year) (p-value = 0.001).
There was no difference between fraud
and no-fraud firms in the average number
Boards of fraud firms met
of board meetings for the 1991-1999 subsignificantly more often than boards
period, but fraud firms had statistically
of no-fraud firms. This difference may
reflect the fact that fraud firms often
more board meetings than no-fraud firms
experienced financial stress preceding
for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value =
the fraud period, which precipitated
0.005). These differences may reflect the
additional board meetings.
fact that fraud firms often experienced
financial stress, perhaps precipitating
additional board meetings.
Director Turnover
As shown in Table 14, the number of directors who left the board during the first fraud
year was generally quite small (an average of 0.2 directors left fraud firm boards as
compared to an average of 0.4 directors leaving no-fraud boards), but this difference
was statistically significant (p-value = 0.045). Fifteen percent of fraud firms had a
director leave the board during the first fraud year, while 25 percent of the no-fraud
firms had a director leave the board during the comparable year, and this difference
was statistically significant (p-value =
0.018). Thus, during the first fraud year,
During the first fraud year, director
director turnover was lower for fraud firms
turnover was lower for fraud firms
than for no-fraud firms.
than for no-fraud firms.
There was no difference between
fraud and no-fraud firms in the number of
directors who left the board during the first fraud year in either of the two sub-periods.
However, during the 1991-1999 sub-period, 13 percent of fraud and 23 percent of nofraud firms had a director leave the board during the first fraud year, a difference that
was statistically significant (p-value = 0.058). During the 2001-2004 sub-period, the
same percentage (25 percent) of fraud and no-fraud firms had a director leave the
board during the first fraud year.
Blockholders
Often an individual or entity owns a significant portion of a company’s common shares.
These are generally referred to as “blockholders.” Consistent with corporate
governance literature, we defined an outside blockholder as an individual or an entity
that owned five percent or more of the firm’s stock. We gathered data about the extent
of blockholder ownership, which also is reported in Table 14.
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We found that approximately two-thirds of both fraud and no-fraud firms had an
outside blockholder who was not a director (67 percent of fraud firms and 74 percent
of no-fraud firms). Also, 23 percent of fraud and 24 percent of no-fraud firms had an
outside blockholder who was a director.
During the 1991-1999 sub-period, fraud companies were significantly less likely
to have an outside blockholder who was not a director. Fifty-eight percent of fraud
firms had a blockholder who was not a director, while 75 percent of no-fraud firms had
a blockholder who was not a director. That difference was statistically significant (pvalue = 0.009). That difference did not continue for the 2001-2004 sub-period.
Internal Audit
Requirements to disclose the existence of an internal audit function did not exist for the
entire period of the study. We identified disclosures (some may have been voluntary) of
an internal audit function for approximately 30 percent of both the fraud and no-fraud
firms during the full sample time period. Disclosure of an internal audit group was
much more likely in the 2001-2004 sub-period than in the 1991-1999 sub-period for
both fraud and no-fraud firms. Less than 20 percent of firms voluntarily disclosed
having an internal audit function in the 1991-1999 sub-period, while about 50 percent
of firms disclosed having an internal audit function in the 2001-2004 sub-period.
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Table 14 – Other Full Board and Governance Characteristics (Means)

Number of board
meetings per year

183

7.7

6.6

1.1

0.001

99

7.6

6.6

1.0

49

8.0

6.2

1.8

Number of directors who
left the board during the
first fraud year

203

0.2

0.4

-0.2

0.045

113

0.2

0.4

-0.2

52

0.4

0.3

0.1

Percentage of companies
that had a director leave
during the first fraud
year

203

15%

25%

-10%

0.018

113

13%

23%

-10%

0.058

52

25%

25%

0%

Percentage of companies
with an outside
blockholder who was not
a director

196

67%

74%

-7%

107

58%

75%

-17%

0.009

52

77%

77%

0%

Percentage of companies
with an outside
blockholder who was a
director

196

23%

24%

-1%

107

21%

19%

2%

52

21%

29%

-8%

Percentage of companies
disclosing existence of an
internal audit function

203

32%

29%

3%

113

19%

18%

1%

52

50%

48%

2%

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

2001-2004 Sample

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

p-value

1991-1999 Sample
Fraud ―
No-Fraud

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample

0.005
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Audit Committee Characteristics
Audit committees are generally responsible for the board’s oversight of the financial
reporting process. We gathered extensive information about selected audit committee
characteristics. Among the set of 203 pairs of fraud and no-fraud firms, 193 fraud firms
had an audit committee and 199 no-fraud firms had an audit committee. So that we
could continue to have a set of fraud companies similarly paired with no-fraud
companies, we reduced the size of the sample for our analysis of audit committee
characteristics to 188 pairs of fraud and no-fraud firms that both had audit committees.
This same reasoning applies to the other variables where the sample size was less than
203.
Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency
As reported in Table 15, 95 percent of fraud firms maintained an audit committee while
98 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit committee (the difference was
statistically significant (p-value = 0.066)). The average size of audit committees for both
fraud and no-fraud firms was about three members. Consistent with the Blue Ribbon
Committee (BRC) Report recommendation that audit committees have at least three
members (a recommendation subsequently adopted by the stock exchanges) 70
percent of the fraud firms and 79 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit
committee with at least three members. The difference was statistically significant (pvalue = 0.044).
On average, the audit committees of fraud firms had more inside directors (5
percent of the audit committee membership) than the audit committees of no-fraud
firms (2 percent), and that difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.008).
Likewise, 87 percent of fraud firms had no insiders on the audit committee, versus 94
percent of no-fraud firms. This difference was significant (p-value = 0.014). Sixty-four
percent of the fraud firms and 67 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit
committee that was composed entirely (100 percent
of the audit committee membership) of outside,
Few differences existed
independent directors. This difference was not
between audit committees of
statistically significant.
fraud firms and no-fraud
firms.

In both sub-periods, there were no differences
between fraud and no-fraud firms in audit committee
existence or average audit committee size. Only in the 1991-1999 sub-period, the
percentage of fraud firms with an audit committee composed of at least three members
was significantly lower than for no-fraud firms (p-value = 0.050).
Relating to audit committee independence, the only statistically significant
difference between fraud and no-fraud firms in the sub-periods was that fraud firms
had more inside directors than no-fraud firms, but this result only held for the 19911999 sub-period (8 percent and 3 percent, respectively (p-value = 0.037)). Likewise,
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no-fraud firms in the 1991-1999 sub-period were more likely to have no insiders on the
audit committee (p-value = 0.048). Audit committees were more independent in the
2001-2004 sub-period than in the 1991-1999 sub-period for both fraud and no-fraud
firms.
Finally, the average number of audit committee meetings per year was 3.5 for
fraud firms and 3.7 for no-fraud firms, and about half of all audit committees met four
or more times per year. There were no significant differences between fraud and nofraud firms in the full sample or in either sub-period.
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Table 15 – Audit Committee Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency (Means)

96%

-4%

52

98%

100%

-2%

3.2

-0.1

100

3.0

3.2

-0.2

51

3.4

3.4

0

Percentage of companies with an
audit committee composed of at
least three members

188

70%

79%

-9%

0.044

100

61%

74%

-13%

0.050

51

92%

92%

0%

188
188
188

5%
11%
84%

2%
11%
87%

3%
0%
-3%

0.008

100
100
100

8%
13%
79%

3%
15%
82%

5%
-2%
-3%

0.037

51
51
51

3%
8%
89%

1%
7%
92%

2%
1%
-3%

Percentage of companies with an
audit committee consisting of no
inside directors

188

87%

94%

-7%

0.014

100

80%

90%

-10%

0.048

51

96%

98%

-2%

Percentage of companies whose
audit committee consisted
entirely of outside directors

188

64%

67%

-3%

100

53%

56%

-3%

51

76%

78%

-2%

Number of audit committee
meetings per year

170

3.5

3.7

-0.2

93

2.6

2.9

-0.3

47

5.1

4.9

0.2

Percentage of companies where
audit committee met at least
four times per year

170

45%

51%

-6%

93

23%

31%

-8%

47

81%

85%

-4%

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

92%

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

3.1

No-Fraud
Sample

188

Fraud Sample

Number of individuals on audit
committee

# of Pairs of
Firms

113

0.066

p-value

-3%

Type of audit committee
member:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

98%

2001-2004 Sample

No-Fraud
Sample

95%

Fraud Sample

203

# of Pairs of
Firms

Existence of an audit committee

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

1991-1999 Sample
No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample
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Financial expertise and governance expertise
We also gathered data about the expertise of individuals who served on the audit
committee. A board member was coded as having accounting or finance expertise if he
or she had current or prior experience as a CFO, CPA, controller, or vice president of
finance. Results are provided in Table 16. On average, 14 percent of audit committee
members for fraud and 10 percent for no-fraud firms had accounting or finance
expertise. That difference was statistically significant for the full sample (p-value =
0.053) for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.006). Similarly, in the 1991-1999
sub-period, 33 percent of the fraud firms
and only 20 percent of no-fraud firms
Surprisingly, the percentage of
had at least one audit committee
individuals on audit committees with
member with accounting or finance
finance or accounting expertise was
expertise, a significant difference (psignificantly higher for fraud firms than
value = 0.037). Both fraud and no-fraud
no-fraud firms for the full sample and
firms were more likely to have at least
the 1991-1999 sub-period.
one financial expert on the audit
committee in more recent years.
Because experience serving as a director might impact an individual’s
effectiveness as a board member, we collected data about the average number of
director positions held on other company boards (other than the relevant fraud or nofraud firms) by audit committee members. We found that average was similar for fraud
and no-fraud firms (1.2 and 1.1 other directorships held by audit committee members
for fraud and no-fraud firms, respectively).
Audit Committee Chair, Charter, and Committee Appointment Process
The overwhelming majority of audit committee chairs were outside directors (93
percent for fraud and 91 percent for no-fraud firms, respectively; difference not
statistically significant).20 Overall, relatively few audit committee chairs had accounting
or finance expertise, with no significant difference between fraud and no-fraud firms.
However, for the 1991-1999 sub-period, 18 percent of the audit committee chairs of
fraud firms and zero percent of audit committee chairs of no-fraud firms had
accounting or finance expertise; this difference was statistically significant (p-value =
0.070).
Thirty-two percent of the fraud and 35 percent of no-fraud firms in the full
sample included the audit committee report or charter in the proxy statement
(difference not statistically significant). Only three percent of fraud firms and one
percent of no-fraud firms included an audit committee report or charter in the proxy
during 1991-1999. However, during the 2001-2004 sub-period, 81 percent of fraud
firms and 94 percent of no-fraud firms included an audit committee report or charter in
Only 43 pairs of firms disclosed the name of the chair of the audit committee. Given the small sample
size, results related to the audit committee chair should be interpreted with caution.
20
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the proxy statement. The difference during the
2001-2004 period between fraud and no-fraud
firms was statistically different (p-value = 0.038).
Charters became much more common in proxy
statements as a result of a BRC Report
recommendation that was adopted by the stock
exchanges.

In the 2001-2004 sub-period,
fraud firms were less likely than
no-fraud firms to include an
audit committee charter or
report in the proxy.

We also gathered data on whether audit committee members, including the
committee chair, joined the board after the current CEO (at the time the fraud began)
was appointed. To the extent that a greater percentage of committee members joined
the board after the current CEO was appointed, the current CEO may have played a
greater role in their appointment and, as a result, may have had greater influence over
the respective board committee. For both fraud and no-fraud firms, at least two-thirds
of audit committee members and chairs were appointed after the current CEO assumed
his or her position, with differences not statistically different in the full sample or either
sub-period.
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Table 16 – Other Audit Committee Characteristics (Means)

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

# of Pairs
of Firms

Fraud
Sample

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

10%

4%

100

15%

7%

8%

0.006

51

16%

16%

0%

Percentage of audit committees
with at least one accounting or
finance expert

188

34%

28%

6%

100

33%

20%

13%

0.037

51

43%

43%

0%

Average number of director
positions held by audit
committee members on other
company boards

188

1.2

1.1

0.1

100

1.2

1.0

0.2

51

1.2

1.0

0.2

43
43
43

2%
5%
93%

0%
9%
91%

2%
-4%
2%

17
17
17

6%
6%
88%

0%
6%
94%

6%
0%
-6%

16
16
16

0%
6%
94%

0%
19%
81%

0%
-13%
13%

Percentage of audit committees
whose chair had accounting or
finance expertise

43

21%

14%

7%

17

18%

0%

18%

16

19%

31%

-12%

Percentage of companies that
included audit committee report
or charter in proxy

203

32%

35%

-3%

113

3%

1%

2%

52

81%

94%

-13%

Percentage of audit committee
members who joined audit
committee after CEO appointed

188

77%

75%

2%

100

81%

73%

8%

51

73%

75%

-2%

Percent of audit committees
whose chair joined board after
CEO appointed

43

67%

67%

0%

17

59%

59%

0%

16

81%

88%

-7%

Type of audit committee chair:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director

0.053

0.070

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).

www.coso.org

Page 55

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

14%

p-value

Fraud
Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

188

2001-2004 Sample

# of Pairs
of Firms

No-Fraud
Sample

Percentage of audit committee
members with accounting or
finance expertise

p-value

Fraud
Sample

1991-1999 Sample

# of Pairs
of Firms

Full Sample

0.038
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Compensation Committee Characteristics
We gathered information about several characteristics of the companies’ compensation
committees. The analysis of this information is provided in the sections that follow. We
analyzed compensation committees because compensation, especially executive
compensation, can affect management’s motivation to commit fraud.
Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency
As reported in Table 17, fraud firms were significantly less likely to have maintained a
compensation committee than no-fraud firms. While 88 percent of fraud firms
maintained a compensation committee, 94 percent of no-fraud firms maintained a
compensation committee. That difference was significant (p-value = 0.058). The
average compensation committee size
was 3.1 members for fraud firms and
A large majority of both fraud and no3.2 members for no-fraud firms. Sixtyfraud firms had compensation committees,
nine percent of the fraud and 75
and there were relatively few differences
percent of no-fraud firms maintained a
in the characteristics of those committees
compensation committee with at least
between fraud and no-fraud firms.
three members. These differences were
not statistically significant.
As for the composition of compensation committees, 85 percent of fraud firm
compensation committee membership and 88 percent of no-fraud firm compensation
committee membership consisted of outside directors. This difference was not
statistically significant. Eighty-nine percent of the fraud firms and 90 percent of nofraud firms had a compensation committee with no insiders; this difference was not
statistically significant. Also, 66 percent of the fraud and 70 percent of no-fraud firms
maintained a compensation committee that was composed entirely of outside,
independent directors. This difference was not statistically significant.
The average number of compensation committee meetings per year was 3.3 for
fraud firms and 3.2 for no-fraud firms. Also, 73 percent of fraud firm compensation
committees and 74 percent of no-fraud firm compensation committees met at least two
times per year. Neither difference was significant.
While for the full sample, fraud firms were less likely to have had a
compensation committee, this difference between fraud and no-fraud firms for each of
the two sub-periods was not statistically significant. In both sub-periods, there were no
other significant differences between fraud and no-fraud firms with respect to
compensation committee characteristics in Table 17. Finally, unlike the case for audit
committees, there was no notable improvement in compensation committee
independence across the two sub-periods.
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Table 17 – Compensation Committee Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency (Means)

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

94%

98%

-4%

-0.1

88

3.0

3.1

-0.1

48

3.3

3.1

0.2

75%

-6%

88

69%

76%

-7%

48

77%

67%

10%

4%
11%
85%

3%
9%
88%

1%
2%
-3%

88
88
88

4%
12%
84%

4%
10%
86%

0%
2%
-2%

48
48
48

6%
8%
86%

3%
8%
89%

3%
0%
-3%

170

89%

90%

-1%

88

90%

88%

2%

48

85%

92%

-7%

Percentage of companies with
compensation committee consisted
entirely of outside directors

170

66%

70%

-4%

88

64%

69%

-5%

48

71%

69%

2%

Number of compensation committee
meetings per year

153

3.3

3.2

0.1

80

3.1

3.0

0.1

46

3.5

3.4

0.1

Percentage of companies where
compensation committee met at least
two times per year

153

73%

74%

-1%

80

70%

74%

-4%

46

78%

70%

8%

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud
-6%

Number of individuals on
compensation committee

170

3.1

3.2

Percentage of companies with a
compensation committee composed of
at least three members

170

69%

170
170
170

Percentage of companies with a
compensation committee consisting of
no inside directors

Type of compensation committee
member:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director

0.058

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

Fraud Sample

52

94%

# of Pairs of
Firms

-6%

88%

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

90%

203

# of Pairs of
Firms

84%

Existence of a compensation
committee

p-value

113

# of Pairs of
Firms

No-Fraud
Sample

2001-2004 Sample

Fraud Sample

1991-1999 Sample
Fraud Sample

Full Sample
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Financial Expertise and Governance Expertise
Because components of executive compensation are sometimes based on financial
statement outcome measures (e.g., bonus based on earnings), we examined the extent
to which compensation committees are composed of individuals with accounting or
finance expertise. Table 18 reports that, on average, nine percent of compensation
committee members for fraud firms and five percent of no-fraud firms’ compensation
committee members had accounting or finance expertise. Also, 22 percent of the fraud
firms and 14 percent of no-fraud firms had at least one member with accounting or
finance expertise on the compensation committee. Both differences were statistically
significant (p-values = 0.012 and 0.034, respectively). The average number of other
director positions held by compensation committee members was similar for fraud and
no-fraud firms (1.3 and 1.2, respectively).
Similar to the full sample results, the
percentage (10 percent) of compensation
Surprisingly, the percentage of
committee members having accounting or
individuals on compensation
finance expertise was statistically higher for
committees with finance or
fraud firms (p-value = 0.018) than the
accounting expertise was
percentage (4 percent) for no-fraud firms in
significantly higher for fraud firms
the 1991-1999 sub-period. Similarly, in the
than no-fraud firms for the full
1991-1999 sub-period, 23 percent of fraud
sample and the 1991-1999 subfirms had at least one accounting or finance
period.
expert on the compensation committee, versus
11 percent of no-fraud firms (p = 0.045). The
differences between the fraud and no-fraud firms in the 2001-2004 sub-period related
to accounting and finance expertise on the compensation committee were not
significant. There was no statistically significant difference between the fraud and the
no-fraud firms in the average number of other directorships held by compensation
committee members in either sub-period.
Compensation Committee Chair and Committee Appointment Process
The overwhelming majority of compensation committee chairs were outside directors
(89 percent for fraud and 97 percent for no-fraud firms; not statistically significant).21
Virtually none of the compensation committee chairs had accounting or finance
expertise. This finding is interesting given the accounting and financial implications of
firm compensation practices and the associated fraud risk that certain compensation
practices may entail.
Seventy-five percent of the fraud firm compensation committee members joined
the board after the CEO was appointed as compared to 70 percent for no-fraud firms.
Only 38 pairs of firms disclosed the name of the chair of the compensation committee. Given the small
sample size, results related to the compensation committee chair should be interpreted with caution.
21
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That difference was not statistically significant. There also was no statistical difference
between fraud and no-fraud firms in whether the compensation committee chair joined
the board after the CEO assumed his or her position.
There was no statistically significant difference between the fraud and no-fraud
firms, in either sub-period, in the percentage of outside directors serving as chair of the
compensation committee or in the percentage of committee chairs with accounting or
finance expertise. Compensation committee members of fraud firms were significantly
more likely than no-fraud firms to have joined the board after the CEO assumed his or
her position in the 1991-1999 sub-period (80 percent for fraud firms compared to 67
percent for no-fraud firms (p-value = 0.031)). This result did not continue in the 20012004 sub-period. There was no difference, in either sub-period, between fraud and nofraud firms as it relates to the compensation committee chair joining after the CEO was
appointed.
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Table 18 – Other Compensation Committee Characteristics (Means)

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

9%

5%

4%

0.012

88

10%

4%

6%

0.018

48

10%

6%

4%

Percentage of compensation
committees with at least one
accounting or finance expert

170

22%

14%

8%

0.034

88

23%

11%

12%

0.045

48

27%

15%

12%

Average number of director
positions held by compensation
committee members on other
company boards

170

1.3

1.2

0.1

88

1.3

1.3

0.0

48

1.3

1.0

0.3

38
38
38

3%
8%
89%

0%
3%
97%

3%
5%
-8%

15
15
15

0%
13%
87%

0%
0%
100%

0%
13%
-13%

13
13
13

8%
0%
92%

0%
8%
92%

8%
-8%
0%

Percentage of compensation
committees whose chair had
accounting or finance expertise

38

0%

3%

-3%

15

0%

0%

0%

13

0%

8%

-8%

Percentage of compensation
committee members who joined
compensation committee after
CEO appointed

170

75%

70%

5%

88

80%

67%

13%

48

67%

70%

-3%

Percentage of compensation
committees whose chair joined
board after CEO appointed

38

61%

68%

-7%

15

67%

53%

14%

13

62%

77%

-15%

Type of compensation
committee chair:
Inside director
Grey director
Outside director

0.031

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

170

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

Percentage of compensation
committee members with
accounting or finance expertise

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

2001-2004 Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

# of Pairs of
Firms

1991-1999 Sample
No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample
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Board Leadership Issues and Related Party Transactions
Board Leadership Issues, Appointment Process, and Personal Relationships22
As reported in Table 19, and consistent with the general practice in the U.S., the CEO also
served as chairman of the board in more than two-thirds of both fraud and no-fraud firms.
There was no statistically significant difference between fraud and no-fraud firms. We also
examined the role of the company’s founder in the firm’s governance process. The CEO was
also the company’s founder for 27 percent of fraud firms as compared to 22 percent for nofraud firms; however, that difference was not statistically significant.
The founder was on the board of directors for 42 percent of the fraud firms as
compared to 36 percent for no-fraud firms, but the difference was not statistically
significant. Approximately 80 percent of directors joined the board after the CEO assumed
his or her position, and there was no statistically significant difference between the fraud
and no-fraud firms. Finally, family relationships among non-employee directors and
company officers existed for 6 percent of the fraud companies as compared to 13 percent
for the no-fraud companies. That difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.012)
for the full sample and for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value = 0.008).

We attempted to gather data on nominating committee characteristics as well. However, we only had 28
pairs of observations with nominating committee data. Given this small sample, we chose not to present any
data. Notwithstanding this fact, fraud companies were less likely to have a nominating committee (p-value =
0.056), although this result only held in the 1991-1999 sub-period.
22

www.coso.org

Page 61

Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies

Table 19 – Board Leadership Issues

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

70%

68%

2%

105

70%

70%

0%

50

66%

58%

8%

Percentage of companies where
CEO/President and the company
founder were the same
individual

203

27%

22%

5%

113

29%

23%

6%

52

19%

19%

0%

Percentage of companies where
the company founder served on
the board

203

42%

36%

6%

113

42%

36%

6%

52

35%

37%

-2%

Percentage of board members
who joined board after CEO
appointed

203

80%

77%

3%

113

82%

77%

5%

52

77%

77%

0%

Percentage of companies where
board had at least one nonemployee director related to an
officer of the company

203

6%

13%

-7%

113

8%

11%

-3%

52

2%

17%

-15%

0.012

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

192

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

Percentage of companies where
CEO/President and board chair
were the same individual

p-value

No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

2001-2004 Sample

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

# of Pairs of
Firms

1991-1999 Sample
No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample

0.008
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Related Party Transactions
As shown in Table 20, fraudulent financial reporting was more likely when a firm disclosed
related party transactions. We found that 79 percent of fraud firms had disclosed a related
party transaction in the proxy statement, as compared to 71 percent for no-fraud firms.
That difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.065). However, that difference was
not statistically significant for either sub-period.
For fraud firms, 26 percent of the
related party transactions involved the
founder, whereas 22 percent of the related
party transactions involved the founder for
the no-fraud firms. This difference was not
statistically
significant.
Related
party
transactions involving the founder occurred
less often in recent years.

Although over 70 percent of fraud
and no-fraud firms disclosed related
party transactions, fraud firms were
significantly more likely to have
disclosed a related party transaction
than no-fraud firms.

Just over 50 percent of the related party transactions involved the CEO, although
there was no difference between the fraud and no-fraud firms on an overall basis or in
either of the two sub-periods examined. Related party transactions involving other senior
officers or involving board members occurred approximately 50 percent of the time, but
there were no significant differences between fraud and no-fraud firms.
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Table 20 – Related Party Transactions

70%

5%

52

87%

77%

10%

26%

22%

4%

60

28%

27%

1%

35

14%

11%

3%

Percentage of disclosed related
party transactions that involved
the CEO

117

51%

54%

-3%

60

58%

53%

5%

35

31%

46%

-15%

Percentage of disclosed related
party transactions that involved
other senior officers

117

52%

50%

2%

60

47%

47%

0%

35

51%

51%

0%

Percentage of disclosed related
party transactions that involved
members of the board of
directors

117

61%

66%

-5%

60

67%

67%

0%

35

51%

60%

-9%

Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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p-value

75%

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

113

0.065

No-Fraud
Sample

117

Fraud Sample

Percentage of disclosed related
party transactions that involved
the founder

# of Pairs of
Firms

8%

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

71%

2001-2004 Sample

No-Fraud
Sample

79%

Fraud Sample

203

# of Pairs of
Firms

Percentage of companies with
related party transactions
disclosed in the proxy

p-value

Fraud ―
No-Fraud

1991-1999 Sample
No-Fraud
Sample

Fraud Sample

# of Pairs of
Firms

Full Sample
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ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR
Auditors Associated With Fraud Companies
We obtained information from the COMPUSTAT® database about the auditor who
issued the audit opinion on the last set of audited financial statements issued during the
fraud period to identify the auditor responsible for issuing the audit opinion on those
fraudulently misstated financial statements. We were able to obtain information about
the nature of the auditor’s opinion for the last fraudulently issued financial statements
for 223 of the 347 fraud firms. We were able to obtain auditor data for 247 of the nofraud firms.23
As reported in the pie charts in Table 21, we found that the Big Six/Four audited
79 percent of the fraud companies (177 of the 223 fraud companies with available
auditor information) in the last year of the fraud period. The next tier of four national
audit firms beyond the Big Six/Four24 audited 6 percent (n = 13) of the fraud firm
financial statements, while the remaining 15 percent (n = 33) of fraud firm financial
statements were audited by non-national firms. These percentages were similar to the
mix of auditor type for the 247 no-fraud audit firms where we could locate auditor
information.
Table 21 – Size of Audit Firms Issuing Reports on Fraudulent Financial
Statements

Our intent was not to compare the nature of audit opinion for a fraud firm and its similar no-fraud firm.
Instead, we were interested in comparing auditor characteristics as a whole for each group (fraud firms
and no-fraud firms). Thus, we did not need equal numbers of fraud and no-fraud firms for our auditor
analysis.
24
The next tier of four national audit firms is Grant Thornton LLP, BDO Seidman LLP, Crowe Chizek, and
McGladrey LLP.
23
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We also reviewed information about the nature of the auditor’s opinion on the
last set of financial statements that were fraudulently misstated to determine whether
the auditor’s report contained any modifications or qualifications. For the 223 fraud
companies where we were able to obtain audit opinion data from COMPUSTAT®, we
determined that 97 of those 223 audit reports (43 percent) contained unqualified
auditor opinions with no explanatory language. An additional 125 of the 223 fraud
companies’ financial statements (56 percent) contained an auditor’s report that
included an unqualified opinion along with explanatory language. Only one of the 223
auditor opinions was qualified, and no audit opinion was issued for another of the 223
fraud companies examined (collectively 1 percent).
These results differ from the no-fraud firms. The majority of no-fraud firms (64
percent (n = 158) of the 247 no-fraud firms where we had auditor report information)
received unqualified audit opinions without any explanatory language, while the
remaining 36 percent (n = 88) received unqualified opinions accompanied by
explanatory language. No audit opinion was issued for one of the 247 no-fraud
companies examined. See the pie charts in Table 22. More research is needed to
examine the nature of the audit report modification and to determine if there is any
relation between the report modification and the nature of the fraud technique
employed.
Table 22 – Types of Auditor Reports on Last Fraud Financial Statements

Analysis of Auditor Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
Because of the significant time lag between the occurrence of fraud and the subsequent
issuance by the SEC of an AAER, only a small percentage of the fraud companies had
fraud periods extending into 2004 or later, the period when SOX Section 404 internal
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control audits became mandatory for accelerated filers (effective for fiscal years ended
November 15, 2004 or later). We identified 24 fraud companies (40 company years, as
some companies had fraud in 2004, 2005, and/or 2006) with fraud periods including
2004 or later that might be subject to the Section 404 requirements, if the company was
large enough to be an accelerated filer. Of these 40 company years, 18 did not appear to
involve accelerated filers or the company failed to issue a 10-K. This leaves 22 company
years for analysis. While we do provide this analysis, we caution readers about drawing
conclusions about the impact of Section 404 based on this very small sample size.
In 10 of the 22 cases (45 percent), the Section 404 opinion indicated that the
company had effective internal control over financial reporting (see the pie chart in
Table 23). Thus, the auditor concluded that controls were effective, even though the
company was later determined to have fraudulently misstated its financial statements
for this period. In another 10 cases (45 percent), the Section 404 opinion was adverse,
indicating ineffective controls. However, in nine of these instances, the auditor’s report
cited a financial restatement that had already occurred, and in the remaining case, the
auditor cited amendments to the original 10-K that were filed immediately after the
original 10-K filing (due to auditor-detected issues). Thus, in all of the instances where
the auditor concluded that controls were ineffective, there had already been a financial
restatement or other amendment of the 10-K. Finally, in two cases (10 percent), the
original Section 404 opinion indicated effective controls, but the opinion was
subsequently restated to indicate ineffective controls. In both cases, a company
financial restatement apparently triggered the restatement of the auditor’s Section 404
opinion.
Overall, the analysis of Section 404 opinions for the 22 company years with
available data indicates that the opinions indicated effective controls unless there had
already been a financial restatement or amended 10-K. Thus, it does not appear that
adverse Section 404 opinions were diagnostic of future misstatements, but rather
simply reflected already-detected misstatements that resulted in financial restatements
or amended 10-Ks. However, the small sample size provides a very limited perspective
about Section 404 providing fraud detection capability. Further research is warranted
to determine whether there are ways to improve auditors’ ability to detect internal
control weaknesses that may lead to fraud in the future. Additionally, we are unable to
assess whether Section 404 serves as a deterrent for management to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting.
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Table 23 – Analysis of Section 404 Internal Control Opinions
(n = 22 company-years)

Note: In all cases where the Section 404 opinion indicated ineffective controls, the opinion cited a financial
restatement or other amendment of the 10-K.

Alleged Auditor Involvement in the Fraud
In 22 percent of the cases (78 of 347 fraud cases), the external auditor was named in an
AAER. In five of these 78 fraud cases, two different audit firms were named. Thus, the
data in Table 24 describe the accusations against a total of 83 audit firms.25
As indicated in Table 24, out of the 83 cases where the auditor was named, 32
audit firms were charged with violating antifraud statutes (either Rule 10(b)-5 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act or charged with aiding and abetting others in a violation
of Rule 10(b)-5). Of those 32 cases, 11 involved a national audit firm (Big Six/Four or
the next tier of four national audit firms) and 21 involved a non-national audit firm.
In the remaining 51 cases where the auditor was named, the auditor was
accused of violating Rule 102(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act mostly for
performing an alleged substandard audit. Out of these 51 cases, 22 involved a national
audit firm, while 29 involved a non-national audit firm.
The SEC commonly names an individual auditor in the AAER instead of naming the entire audit firm.
For ease of discussion, we refer to the “audit firm” to mean the employer of the named auditor or the firm
itself.
25
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The relative infrequency of enforcement actions against national firms relative
to non-national firms is particularly striking, given that most of the fraud firms were
audited by a national audit firm. Table 21 indicates that 88 percent of the fraud
companies were audited by a national audit firm, yet only 40 percent of the
enforcement actions (33 of 83 enforcement actions) were against a national audit firm
(see Table 24).
Table 24 – Frequency of Audit Firms Named in Enforcement Actions
Auditors
Named in
AAER

Number of
National Firms
Named

Number of NonNational Firms
Named

32

11

21

Non-fraud statutes including Rule
102(e)

51

22

29

Total

83

33

50

SEC Alleged Audit Firm Violation
Anti-fraud statutes

Note: There were 78 fraud cases in which the SEC named an individual at an audit firm or the audit firm
itself in the AAER. For five of the 78 cases, the SEC named individuals at two different audit firms or two
different audit firms.

Auditor Changes During Fraud Period
To determine whether fraud companies changed auditors just prior to or during the
fraud period, we gathered COMPUSTAT® data to compare the name of the auditor
associated with the last clean financial statements to the name of the auditor who
issued an audit report on the last fraudulent financial statements. We were able to make
that comparison for 184 similarly paired fraud and no-fraud firms. As reflected in the
pie charts in Table 25, we found that 47 of
the 184 fraud firms (26 percent) changed
Twenty-eight percent of fraud
auditors between the period that the
companies
switched auditors between
company issued the last clean financial
the issuance of the last clean financial
statements and the period the company
statements and the last set of
issued the last set of fraudulent financial
fraudulently misstated financial
statements. In contrast, only 22 of the 184
statements, while 13 percent of nono-fraud firms (12 percent) switched
fraud firms switched auditors during
auditors over that same time frame. This
the same time period.
difference was statistically significant (pvalue < 0.01).
Most (60 percent) of the fraud firm auditor switches occurred during the fraud
period, while the remaining 40 percent of fraud firm auditor switches occurred at the
end of the last clean financial statement period (i.e., just before the fraud period began).
Of the 47 instances of fraud companies switching auditors, 35 companies (74 percent)
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switched from one national audit firm to another national audit firm, five (11 percent)
switched from a national audit firm to a non-national audit firm, five (11 percent)
switched from a non-national audit firm to a national audit firm, and two (4 percent)
switched among non-national firms. In contrast, 16 of the 22 no-fraud firms (73
percent) switching auditors changed from one national audit firm to another national
audit firm, five (23 percent) switched from a national audit firm to a non-national audit
firm, and one (4 percent) switched from a non-national firm to a national firm.
Table 25 – Auditor Changes Just Prior To or During Fraud Period

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMPANY AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
We attempted to identify consequences for companies engaging in fraudulent financial
reporting once the fraud was revealed. First, we noted consequences described in the
AAERs for each of the 347 fraud companies.
Table 26 presents information in the AAERs on the sanctions imposed by the
SEC against both companies and individuals as a result of the fraud.26 The most
common sanctions were cease and desist orders, officer and director and SEC bars, and
monetary penalties. A cease and desist order compels a party to stop engaging in
certain behavior, and the recipient of such an order can be a company or an individual.
A cease and desist order is the mildest sanction that the SEC can impose in a fraud case,
and it was the most commonly employed sanction (89 percent of the fraud companies
received a cease and desist order). Generally, the SEC issues a cease and desist order in

Frequencies of consequences reported in this section are inherently understated given that we were
only able to identify consequences explicitly noted in an AAER or in business press articles. Given that the
business press often does not cover smaller or otherwise less visible companies, there were likely to be
many consequences that occurred that we were unable to identify for some of our sample firms.
26
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addition to other sanctions. However, in 29 percent of the cases, the SEC issued a cease
and desist order without issuing any other sanctions.
The SEC can bar an individual from serving as an officer or a director of a public
company, either for a period of time or permanently. This is a severe sanction, as it
seriously affects the economic situation of an
individual receiving such a bar. In almost half
Fines were imposed in 65 percent of
of the fraud cases (47 percent), one or more
the cases, while disgorgements were
individuals received an officer and director
imposed in 43 percent of the cases.
bar. In addition, outside professionals (e.g.,
accountants, attorneys, etc.) can be barred
from practicing before the SEC, either temporarily or permanently. In 46 percent of the
fraud cases, one or more outside professionals was subject to an SEC bar.
SEC sanctions can involve monetary penalties, either fines or disgorgements.
Fines can be levied against companies and individuals, and were imposed in 65 percent
of the fraud cases. A disgorgement involves returning monies inappropriately received
as a result of the fraud. For example, an individual might be required to disgorge a
bonus received based on fraudulently reported income or the proceeds from a stock
sale when the stock price was inflated as a result of the fraud. Disgorgements were
ordered in 43 percent of the fraud cases.
Table 26 – Consequences Based on AAER Information (n = 347)

Table 27 presents information on the monetary penalties imposed by the SEC –
for cases in which the dollar amounts were disclosed in the AAERs. The average fine
imposed by the SEC was $12.4 million, and the median was $100,000 (maximum fine
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was $750 million). The cumulative fines for all 347 fraud cases imposed by the SEC
totaled $2.74 billion. The mean and median disgorgement amounts were $18.1 million
and $195,000, respectively (maximum amount of a disgorgement was $700 million).
Cumulative disgorgements across all of the 347 fraud cases totaled $2.65 billion.
Table 27 – Fines and Disgorgements Based on AAER Information (n = 347)

Description
of Penalty
Fines and
settlements
Disgorgements

Number of
Companies
Identified
221
146

Cumulative
Amount Paid
by All
Companies

Mean
Amount Paid
by a Single
Company

Median
Amount Paid
by a Single
Company

$2.74 billion

$12.4 million

$100,000

$2.65 billion

$18.1 million

$195,000

Maximum
Paid
$750
million
$700
million

Other Consequences for Companies
To identify other consequences to the fraud companies for engaging in fraudulent
financial reporting, we performed extensive searches of electronic databases of
business press articles appearing during the period beginning with the calendar year
that coincides with the last year of the fraud and ending with the calendar year two
years after the SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud.
We also performed the search of business press articles for the sample of nofraud companies. This allows us to determine whether the rate of subsequent
consequences was different for fraud companies relative to a similar set of companies
not engaging in fraud during the same time periods.
Recall in our earlier analysis of board governance characteristics that we were
able to generate a sample of 203 fraud and 203 similar no-fraud firms. As discussed in
that section, we were unable to examine board governance variables for the full sample
of 347 firms due to the lack of available proxy statements for some firms. For our
business press searches, we were able to expand our sample to 311 fraud and 311 nofraud firms (we were not able to identify a similar no-fraud company in 36 cases).
In addition to SEC sanctions (e.g., fines, disgorgements, cease and desist orders),
companies can suffer other consequences either directly, or indirectly, as a result of the
fraud. We examined the incidence of financial failure (bankruptcy, liquidation, etc.),
stock exchange delisting, and material asset sales for the fraud companies and the
comparable percentages for the no-fraud sample.
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As shown in Table 28, 28 percent of the fraud companies failed (filed for
bankruptcy, were liquidated, etc.) within two years of the latest AAER issued by the
SEC. The comparable percentage for the nofraud companies was 13 percent. The
Fraud firms filed for bankruptcy or
probability of bankruptcy or other failure for
were delisted from a stock exchange
a fraud firm was statistically larger than for a
significantly more often in the time
no-fraud firm (p-value < 0.001). Similarly,
period following the fraud than
fraud firms were significantly more likely
their
counterpart no-fraud firms in
than no-fraud firms to be involuntarily
that same time period.
delisted from a stock exchange (p-value <
0.001). Almost half (47 percent) of fraud
firms suffered by being delisted by a stock
exchange, whereas only 20 percent of no-fraud firms were delisted during a similar
time period. Finally, 62 percent of fraud companies compared to 31 percent of no-fraud
companies engaged in a material asset sale (p-value < 0.001).
All of the above metrics clearly indicate that fraud firms were more likely to
suffer adverse financial outcomes than no-fraud firms. These differences were likely
due to the fact that companies that experienced operating difficulties chose to engage in
fraud to mask these difficulties, and to the direct and indirect costs associated with
fraud (e.g., legal fees, fines, investigations, reputation damage, loss of personnel, loss of
customers, etc.).
Table 28 – Other Consequences to Companya (n = 311)b

Fraud
Companies
Affected

Percentage
of Fraud
Companies
Affected

No-Fraud
Companies
Affected

Percentage
of No-Fraud
Companies
Affected

86

28%

39

13%

p-valuec
0.001

Involuntary stock exchange
delistingd

147

47%

61

20%

0.001

Material asset sales

193

62%

96

31%

0.001

Subsequent
Consequences
Bankrupt, liquidated, etc.

a The consequences of the fraud were examined from the beginning of the last fraud year until two years after the year of the
last AAER related to the fraud. The occurrence of these events at the no-fraud companies was examined during the identical
time period.
b There were 311 fraud companies where a similar no-fraud company could be identified.
c Tests of statistical differences were performed using Wilcoxon’s signed rank test.
d Includes revocation of a firm’s registration with the SEC.
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically
significant (two-tailed).
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Stock Price Reaction
To further examine the effect of the fraud on the company, we examined the stock price
reaction for two different dates related to the disclosure of the alleged financial
statement fraud. First, we examined the stock price reaction to the initial disclosure of
the fraud. Second, we examined the stock price reaction to the initial disclosure of an
investigation by the SEC or the Department of Justice.
We identified the date of the initial disclosure of an alleged financial statement
fraud by searching for the initial press disclosure of a potential accounting impropriety.
We took this approach since the initial press disclosure of an alleged accounting
impropriety may not specifically indicate that a fraud has occurred, given that in many
instances an investigation has yet to be commenced. Because that initial disclosure may
or may not suggest to the markets the existence of a possible fraud, we identified a
second date to measure stock market reactions. That date represents the date of the
SEC’s or Department of Justice’s first public disclosure of an investigation.
We measured the stock reaction on these two different disclosure dates by
calculating the abnormal stock returns using methodologies widely used in research to
capture unique stock reactions to disclosures of new information to the capital markets.
An abnormal stock return basically captures the portion of the change in stock price
attributable to the company-specific news disclosed on that date and does not include
normal changes for that firm’s stock given changes in overall market conditions.27
Initial Disclosure of Potential Accounting Improprieties
For each of the two different disclosure events described above, we measured the
abnormal returns over three different days. First, we measured the abnormal return in
the day prior to the initial disclosure of the fraud (referred to as Day -1). Measuring
stock market reactions on the day prior to the date of disclosure captures any stock
market reaction to potential leakage of information in the day prior to disclosure. Next,
we measured the abnormal return on the day of disclosure (referred to as Day 0).
Finally, we measured the abnormal return on the day following the date of disclosure,
which captures the stock price reaction on the next trading day following the date of
disclosure (referred to as Day +1).
Table 29 provides information about the abnormal returns measured on each of
these three days surrounding the first public disclosure of an alleged financial
statement fraud. That table also shows the cumulative abnormal return for Days 0 and
+1 on a combined basis, which is consistent with typical abnormal stock return
We calculated abnormal returns using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and
the Eventus program, using the market model with an equally weighted index consistent with prior
research methodologies (see DeFond et al. (2007) and MacKinlay (1997)). We estimated the market
model parameters using a 120-day estimation window consistent with prior research methodologies (see
Palmrose et al. 2004). Given the small size of some of the fraud companies, firms were retained in the
sample if 30 days or more of stock returns were available during the 120-day estimation window.
27
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research. The abnormal returns reported in Table 29 are shown in percentage form to
provide an indication of the percentage change in stock price to the initial disclosure of
alleged financial statement fraud.
As expected, the average abnormal returns for each of the three days and the
cumulative two days (Days 0 and +1) surrounding the first public disclosure of an
alleged fraud were negative. The p-values for
each day indicate that all of the negative
Stock prices declined 17 percent on
abnormal stock returns were highly
average (beyond normal market
statistically significant. The mean abnormal
movement) across two days
return on Day -1 was -1.4 percent, suggesting
surrounding the initial disclosure of
some market reaction to potential leakage of
alleged fraud.
news of an alleged fraud. The mean stock
price reaction on the day of disclosure (Day
0) jumped to -10.0 percent, followed by an additional -7.3 percent return on Day +1.
The cumulative average negative abnormal return of -16.7 percent on Days 0 and +1
indicates an abnormal stock price decline of 16.7 percent over the two-day period
surrounding the initial news of fraudulent financial reporting.
Table 29 – Abnormal Stock Returns Surrounding First Public Disclosure of
Potential Accounting Irregularities

Mean
Standard
deviation

Day -1
(n=221)a
-1.4%
0.07

Percentage Abnormal Stock Return
Day 0
Day +1
Days 0 and +1
(n=213) a
(n=198) a
(n=215) a
-10.0%
-7.3%
-16.7%
0.19
0.17
0.23

1st quartile
Median
3rd quartile

-2.5%
-0.5%
1.4%

-17.2%
-3.3%
0.4%

-12.6%
-2.2%
1.5%

-28.6%
-11.1%
-1.7%

t-statistic
p-value

-3.21
0.001

-23.19
0.0001

-16.89
0.0001

-27.25
0.0001

a Of the 347 fraud firms, stock price information was not provided for 73 firms in the CRSP database, and we were
unable to identify a unique date of the public disclosure of the potential accounting irregularity for 15 additional
firms. Finally, stock price information for some of the days (-1, 0, or +1) was missing for between 38 and 61 firms,
depending on the date of interest. Thus, the number of firms for each of the measurement dates differed slightly.
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically
significant (two-tailed).
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Initial Disclosure of SEC/Department of Justice Investigation
Table 30 provides information about the abnormal stock returns for the three days (-1,
0, and +1) surrounding the first public disclosure of a governmental investigation of the
potential accounting improprieties, whether that investigation was commenced by the
SEC or by the U.S. Department of Justice. The average abnormal stock return was -0.5
percent on Day -1, but this was not statistically significant, suggesting that the
announcement of a governmental investigation did not leak into the market before the
investigation was announced. However, the mean abnormal returns on day 0 and +1
were -4.9 percent and -2.5 percent, respectively, which were both statistically
significant. Thus, the disclosure of a government investigation of alleged financial
statement fraud resulted in an average
abnormal stock price decline over a twoStock prices declined over 7 percent
day period of 7.3 percent.
on average (beyond normal market
movement) over the two-day period

It is interesting to note that these
surrounding announcement by the
stock price declines were smaller in
SEC or Department of Justice of an
magnitude than those surrounding the
investigation about alleged financial
statement fraud.
initial press disclosure of the potential
accounting improprieties. Nevertheless, the
announcement
of
a
governmental
investigation, while not typically providing
the initial disclosure of the potential accounting improprieties, did provide incremental
information to the market. The market may have reacted to the realities of costs
associated with responding to a governmental investigation and to the adverse
reputational consequences for the firm.
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Table 30 – Abnormal Stock Returns Surrounding First Public Disclosure of SEC or
Department of Justice Investigation

Mean
Standard
deviation

Day -1
(n=142)a
-0.5%

Percentage Abnormal Stock Return
Day 0
Day +1
Days 0 and +1
(n=142) a
(n=140) a
(n=143) a
-4.9%
-2.5%
-7.3%

0.09

0.13

0.11

0.16

1st quartile
Median
3rd quartile

-1.5%
-0.2%
1.6%

-8.0%
-2.2%
0.5%

-6.3%
-1.2%
1.9%

-13.6%
-4.0%
-0.3%

t-statistic
p-value

-1.09
0.28

-10.29
0.0001

-5.39
0.0001

-10.96
0.0001

a Of the 347 fraud firms, stock price information was not provided for 73 firms in the CRSP database, and we were
unable to identify a unique date of the public disclosure of the SEC’s or Department of Justice’s investigation for 78
firms. Finally, stock price information for some of the days (-1, 0, or +1) was missing for between 53 and 56 firms,
depending on the date of interest. Thus, the number of firms for each of the measurement dates differed slightly.
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically
significant (two-tailed).

Other Consequences for Individuals
In addition to SEC sanctions (e.g., fines, disgorgements, SEC officer and director bars,
etc.) described earlier, individuals involved with a fraud can suffer other consequences
in the labor market. We examined turnover (including the specific reason for the
turnover) for the CEO, CFO, chairman of the board, and other board members. In
addition, we considered criminal indictments and convictions of the CEO and CFO. We
examined consequences of the fraud for individuals that occurred between the
beginning of the last fraud year through two years after the year of the last AAER
related to the fraud.
Table 31 presents this information. Because we captured information about
management changes and other events, it was important that we contrasted the
experience of fraud firms with a similar set of no-fraud firms. Thus, Table 31 shows
results for both fraud and no-fraud firms. We tracked similar consequences for no-fraud
firms over the same time frame used for their related fraud firms. We were able to find
similar no-fraud firms for 311 of the 347 fraud firms.
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In most cases, turnover occurred for the CEO and CFO positions of companies
committing fraud. Eighty-two percent of the CEOs and 80 percent of the CFOs of fraud
firms experienced turnover. The comparable percentages for the no-fraud firms were
47 percent for CEOs and 49 percent for CFOs, significantly lower (p-value = 0.001). A
large majority of the CEO and CFO turnover was due to resignations, although we
cannot observe how many of these resignations were forced. Seven percent of the fraud
companies experienced CEO terminations while 59 percent experienced CEO
resignations. In contrast, during the same time
period no-fraud firms terminated two percent
Eighty percent or more of CEOs
of their CEOs, while 21 percent of the no-fraud
and CFOs turned over following
firm CEOs resigned. A similar pattern existed for
the disclosure of the alleged fraud.
CFO turnover at the fraud and no-fraud
companies. That suggests that fraud revelations
often result in significantly greater management
changes.
Twenty-one percent (17 percent) of the fraud CEOs (CFOs) were criminally
indicted, whereas virtually none of the no-fraud CEOs or CFOs was criminally indicated
over the same time periods (statistically significant (p-value = 0.001)). For fraud firms,
64 percent of the CEOs criminally indicted were convicted (41/64), whereas 75 percent
of the CFOs criminally indicted were convicted (39/52). This difference likely reflects
the greater difficulty that CFOs have in denying that they had any knowledge of the
fraud given the CFO’s responsibility for the firm’s finances.
For fraud firms, approximately two-thirds of board chairs and other board
members left the board, whereas only 25 percent of board chairs and 40 percent of
other board members left the boards of no-fraud firms, significantly lower (p-value =
0.001). As was the case with CEO and CFO turnover, resignation was the most common
reason given for the departure. Fifteen percent (32 of 211 instances) of the board chair
turnover at fraud firms was due to the board
chair being terminated, whereas only 11 percent
Approximately 20 percent of CEOs
(9 of 79 instances) of the board chair turnover at
and CFOs of fraud companies were
no-fraud firms was due to a termination. Also, if
criminally indicted, and about twothere was turnover of the CEO, CFO, or board
thirds of those indictments ultimately
chair, the board chair was most likely to be fired.
led to criminal convictions.
Turnover of other board members at both fraud
and no-fraud firms was overwhelmingly due to
resignations, but terminations of other board members occurred in six percent of the
fraud firms. We identified only one instance where a non-chair board member at a nofraud firm was terminated.
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Table 31 – Consequences to Individuals (n = 311)
Number of
Fraud
Firms
Affected

Percentage
of Fraud
Firms
Affected

Number of
No-Fraud
Firms
Affected

Percentage
of No-Fraud
Firms
Affected

255
23
185
17
14
16

82%
7%
59%
6%
5%
5%

147
5
66
24
17
35

47%
2%
21%
8%
5%
11%

250
25
157
14
39
15

80%
8%
51%
4%
12%
5%

153
3
64
18
55
13

49%
1%
21%
6%
18%
4%

0.001

CEO criminal indictment

64

21%

1

< 1%

0.001

CEO criminal conviction

41

13%

1

< 1%

0.010

CFO criminal indictment

52

17%

1

< 1%

0.001

CFO criminal conviction

39

13%

0

0%

0.010

Chairman of board
turnover:
Firing/dismissal
Resignation
Retirement
Another position
Other

211

68%

79

25%

0.001

32
147
16
4
12

10%
47%
5%
1%
4%

9
48
12
0
10

3%
15%
4%
0%
3%

Other board turnover:
Firing/dismissal
Resignation
Retirement
Another position
Other

212
19
177
4
2
10

68%
6%
57%
1%
1%
3%

123
1
103
7
5
7

40%
< 1%
33%
2%
2%
2%

Subsequent
Consequencesa
CEO turnover:
Firing/dismissal
CEO turnover:
Resignation
Retirement
Another position
Other
CFO turnover:
Firing/dismissal
Resignation
Retirement
Another position
Other

p-valueb
0.001

0.001

a The consequences of the fraud for individuals were examined from the beginning of the last fraud year until two years after
the year of the last AAER related to the fraud. The occurrence of these events for individuals at the no-fraud firms was
examined during the identical time period.
b Tests of statistical significance were performed using the Wilcoxon’s signed rank test.
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically
significant (two-tailed).
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IV. Conclusion
We believe that our analysis of fraudulent financial reporting from 1998-2007 reveals
several key messages. First, the financial statement fraud problem still exists and
warrants continued attention. The SEC alleged that 347 public companies committed
fraud over the ten-year period 1998-2007. The magnitude of individual fraud cases and
the size of fraud companies both increased markedly from COSO’s 1999 report. The
major accounting scandals of the early 2000s involved larger frauds and larger
companies, which contributed to the nearly $120 billion in cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation across all frauds in the ten-year period. Because the number of frauds
examined in this study involving financial reporting periods after the passage of the
SOX is very limited, further research is needed to assess the effects of the SOX in
addressing fraud.
Second, the SEC continues to name individuals in the C-suite for some alleged
involvement in the fraud, even more so than in the past. During 1998-2007, the CEO
and/or CFO were named in an AAER in nearly 90 percent of the cases. Boards, auditors,
and regulators need to seek additional tools to assess management integrity and
susceptibility to fraud pressures. Research about leadership and organizational
behavior may help to provide insights about potential drivers of financial statement
fraud.
Third, revenue fraud continues to emerge as the leading type of fraud, now
accounting for over 60 percent of SEC fraud cases. Additional research into revenue
fraud methods, especially industry-specific studies, may reveal new ways to address
this risk area.
Fourth, board governance characteristics often do not differ meaningfully
between fraud and no-fraud firms. These characteristics have been the focus of recent
regulation, thus reducing or even eliminating previous fraud/no-fraud differences.
Future research on governance processes and the interaction of various governance
mechanisms may be needed to identify less-observable governance differences
associated with fraudulent financial reporting.
Fifth, fraud companies are twice as likely to change auditors as no-fraud firms
between the last clean financial statements and the last fraudulent financial statements.
More research is needed to fully understand the relation between auditor change and
fraudulent financial reporting.
Finally, the consequences of fraud are severe for individuals and companies.
Individuals may face civil fines, SEC bars, disgorgement, and criminal prosecution.
Fraud companies experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines, and
they face bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do
no-fraud firms.
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CALL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
COSO sponsored this study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, to provide a
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission between January 1998 and December
2007. This study updates our understanding of fraudulent financial reporting since
COSO’s 1999 issuance of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997.
COSO’s mission is to provide thought leadership through the development of
comprehensive frameworks, guidance, and research on enterprise risk management,
internal control, and fraud deterrence. COSO’s efforts are designed to improve
organizational performance and governance and to reduce the extent of fraud in
organizations.
COSO hopes that those involved in financial reporting will carefully consider the
results reported in this study and recommit their efforts to improve the prevention,
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. While several insights from
this study are discussed within this document, more research is needed to better
understand fraudulent financial reporting. COSO encourages other thought leaders to
creatively explore new and different ways to reduce occurrences of fraudulent financial
reporting.
COSO, 2010
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